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Attention Must Be Paid: Commercial Speech, 
User-Generated Ads, and the Challenge of 
Regulation  
REBECCA TUSHNET† 
INTRODUCTION 
Today’s attention economy drives ads to become 
quicksilver, moving ever faster. It is harder and harder to 
attract audience eyeballs, especially to content that looks 
like advertising, so advertisers will go to any extreme to 
overcome audiences’ perceptual resistance. Conventional 
false advertising law will attempt to follow ads wherever 
they go, no matter how unusual the format. But where ads 
don’t necessarily look like ads, a different kind of consumer 
deception can be at issue: deception about the independence 
of a source, where consumers might give a message a 
different measure of credibility if they knew its actual 
sponsorship. Non-ad-like ads arguably straddle the line 
between commercial and noncommercial speech, which is 
important because the First Amendment presently tolerates 
much less regulation of the latter. Ads are subject to 
relatively stringent regulation of their truth compared to 
non-ads. If those two categories can no longer be 
distinguished, advertising law will have to be substantially 
rewritten. Despite changes in ad presentation, however, 
regulation is not impossible. We have the tools to ensure 
that new forms of advertising do not destroy advertising law 
as we know it.  
This Article examines the dynamics that drive 
advertisers to push into new formats, and the law’s ability 
to regulate them. Part I discusses the ever-expanding scope 
of advertising and connects this phenomenon to First 
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thinking. Mara Gassmann provided excellent research assistance. 
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Amendment debates over commercial speech. I argue that it 
will remain possible, and constitutional, to identify 
advertising and subject it to prohibitions on false and 
misleading claims, even for ads in unconventional formats.  
Part II then addresses the ways in which regulators 
were caught off-guard by these developments. Section 230 of 
the Communications Decency Act, which frees online 
service providers and users from liability for content 
generated by other users, poses some unanticipated barriers 
to regulating advertising. We might ultimately want to 
amend the law to apply conventional false advertising 
principles to advertiser adoption of pure user-generated 
promotional material. If not, we will have to live with the 
arbitrage opportunity section 230 allows. 
Despite section 230’s provisions, regulators retain 
flexibility in many situations. Part III takes up the Federal 
Trade Commission’s (“FTC”) recent revisions of its guides on 
testimonials and endorsements. The guidelines apply to 
bloggers and others who receive substantial benefits from 
advertisers in return for their endorsements. It has been 
argued that section 230 prevents the FTC from holding 
advertisers liable for paid bloggers’ false and misleading 
claims or failure to disclose a sponsorship relation. After 
exploring the First Amendment challenges posed by such 
situations, including questions that go to the heart of the 
justification for regulating commercial speech, I contend 
that neither section 230 nor sound policy require the FTC to 
ignore these new forms of communicating with potential 
purchasers.  
I. CONTROLLING ADVERTISING AT THE MARGINS 
A. Extreme Speech and Advertising Creep 
The “market” for speech faces problems of access (or 
supply) intimately tied to problems of attention (or 
demand), especially as modern technology has made more 
salient the fact that we are all producers as well as 
consumers of information. Jerome Barron’s classic article on 
access to the press identifies dynamics that encourage 
speech to become ever more intrusive, as a method of 
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catching audiences’ attention.1 But just because speech can 
attract attention—and even provide new and useful 
information—does not mean that it merits First 
Amendment protection. In fact, Barron would not have 
granted any constitutional protection to commercial speech. 
Yet his preferred constitutional regime is directly contrary 
to prevailing First Amendment law in recent decades which 
protects truthful commercial speech against many 
restraints. Despite their differences, both Barron and 
modern commercial speech doctrine justify their conclusions 
with claims about audience needs and rights: what the 
audience wants, or doesn’t know that it wants but would if 
it heard the right pitch. This Part briefly explores new 
practices of attention-getting and their relation to 
commercial speech theory. 
Given the proliferation of options—from hundreds of 
cable channels to billions of webpages—attracting some 
fraction of the world’s attention can be a daunting task.2 
Even speakers who have access to media that can 
theoretically reach the world will often want to go further 
and find actual listeners.3 Search engines have aggravated 
the problem because many people are satisfied with the first 
search result they find, leading to a winner-take-all effect.4 
Predictably, some individuals will misbehave, often as an 
attention-getting device. It is a person sitting in the crowd, 
after all, whom we imagine falsely shouting “fire” in a 
crowded theater, not the well-orchestrated performers who 
already command our attention by default. 
Audiences are hard to predict. We often don’t even know 
ourselves what we’ll want.5 We like novelty and we like 
  
 1. Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Press—A New First Amendment Right, 80 
HARV. L. REV. 1641, 1647 (1967). 
 2. See, e.g., Seth F. Kreimer, Censorship By Proxy: The First Amendment, 
Internet Intermediaries, and the Problem of the Weakest Link, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 
11, 17 & n.13 (2006). 
 3. See generally RICHARD A. LANHAM, THE ECONOMICS OF ATTENTION xi-xii, 233 
(2006) (discussing attention as the limiting resource in the modern information 
economy). 
 4. See Kreimer, supra note 2, at 40 & n.84. 
 5. See Eric Goldman, A Coasean Analysis of Marketing, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 
1151, 1170, 1173-74 (2006) [hereinafter Coasean Marketing] (arguing that 
whether particular audience members would want to receive particular 
advertising messages is often unknowable before the fact, especially as many 
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familiarity; we want the same thing, only different.6 Our 
desires do not so much conflict as reinforce one another, and 
this paradox is part of what makes audiences so 
unpredictable.  
One way to get attention is to turn up the volume, 
either literally or metaphorically, with shock and surprise. 
Barron addressed this tactic as used by radical protestors to 
break down the smug safety of everyday life: 
By the bizarre and unsettling nature of his technique the 
demonstrator hopes to arrest and divert attention long enough 
to compel the public to ponder his message. But attention-
getting devices so abound in the modern world that new ones 
soon become tiresome. The dissenter must look for ever more 
unsettling assaults on the mass mind if he is to have 
continuing impact. Thus, as critics of protest are eager and in 
a sense correct to say, the prayer-singing student 
demonstration is the prelude to Watts. But the difficulty with 
this criticism is that it wishes to throttle protest rather than to 
recognize that protest has taken these forms because it has 
had nowhere else to go.7 
  
preferences may be latent, that is, unknown before exposure to some external 
stimulus such as an ad); Eric Goldman, Data Mining and Attention 
Consumption, in PRIVACY AND TECHNOLOGIES OF IDENTITY: A CROSS-DISCIPLINARY 
CONVERSATION 225, 232 (Katherine Strandburg & Daniela Stan Raicu eds., 
2005) (“In practice, [a calculation of the social welfare effects of marketing] 
cannot be made on an ex ante basis because the recipients’ interests are 
heterogeneous but undisclosed. No one—not the government, not the marketer, 
perhaps not even recipients themselves—precisely knows the recipients’ 
substantive interests, tolerance of attention consumption or reaction to 
receiving a communication. Indeed, a recipient’s utility may vary from day to 
day.”). 
 6. This accounts for the continuing appeal of the sequel. See Marjorie 
Garber, I’ll Be Back, 21 LONDON REV. BOOKS 3 (1999) (“There is a paradox 
implicit in the very concept of the sequel. In experiential terms, a sequel is a 
highly conservative genre that supplies the comfort of familiarity together with 
the small frisson of difference.”) (reviewing PART TWO: REFLECTIONS ON THE 
SEQUEL (Paul Budra & Betty Schellenberg eds., 1998), available at 
http://www.lrb.co.uk/v21/n16/marjorie-garber/ill-be-back. As Garber notes, 
literary theorizing about sequels has been profoundly influenced by Terry 
Castle’s claim that “sequels are always disappointing,” because audiences 
simultaneously hope that the sequel will be different, and that it will be exactly 
the same; those hopes cannot both be realized. TERRY CASTLE, MASQUERADE AND 
CIVILIZATION 133 (1986). 
 7. Barron, supra note 1, at 1647. 
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As with protest, so with pornography: theorists of many 
stripes agree that, as society tolerates more sexual activity 
and display, pornography has to become more extreme to 
excite its consumers.8 If oral sex is no longer taboo, 
pornography will show more anal sex. Pornography thrives 
on flouting boundaries, so it will follow to the edge of those 
boundaries no matter how widely they are drawn.9  
This dynamic also occurs with sellers of goods and 
services in general. As we are exposed to more and more, it 
becomes harder to get our attention, so promoters are forced 
to further extremes. Advertising clutter drives marketers to 
put messages on fire hydrants and potholes,10 on eggs, in 
urinals, on the bellies of pregnant women, and anywhere 
else that might surprise us out of our willful disregard.11 
But the very barrage of sales pitches prompts us to raise our 
threshold for attention, until each ad is almost 
meaningless.12 We work hard to avoid ads, often enlisting 
  
 8. See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE 
STATE 200 (1989) (“Greater efforts of brutality have become necessary to 
eroticize the taboo—each taboo being a hierarchy in disguise—since the frontier 
of the taboo keeps vanishing as one crosses it. Put another way, more and more 
violence has become necessary to keep the progressively desensitized consumer 
aroused to the illusion that sex (and he) is daring and dangerous.”); RICHARD A. 
POSNER, SEX AND REASON 364 (1992) (stating that the more pornography 
circulates, “the more the demand for pornography will shift (not entirely, of 
course) toward aspects of sexual depiction that remain tabooed.”). 
 9. Cf. Amy Adler, The Perverse Law of Child Pornography, 101 COLUM. L. 
REV. 209, 247 (2001) (arguing that people regularly desire to transgress sexual 
boundaries and experience sexuality as forbidden). 
 10. Bruce Schreiner & Emily Fredrix, Newest Fast Food Ad Space: Indiana 
Fire Hydrants, SALON, Jan. 6, 2010, http://www.salon.com/food/2010/01/06/us 
_kfc_ ads_on_hydrants/.  
 11. See, e.g., Laura Petrecca, Product Placement—You Can’t Escape It, USA 
TODAY, Oct. 10, 2006, at 1B, available at http://www.usatoday.com/money/ 
advertising/2006-10-10-ad-nauseum-usat_x.htm; Ellen P. Goodman, Stealth 
Marketing and Editorial Integrity, 85 TEX. L. REV. 83, 144 (2006). 
 12. See, e.g., KEN SACHARIN, ATTENTION! HOW TO INTERRUPT, YELL, WHISPER, 
AND TOUCH CONSUMERS 3 (2001) (“[T]he power of marketing . . . is eroding from 
lack of attention.”); Gerald Zaltman & Robin Higie Coulter, Seeing the Voice of 
the Consumer: Metaphor-Based Advertising Research, 35 J. ADVERTISING RES. 35, 
36 (1995) (“[T]ime famine [makes it] increasingly difficult for advertisers to 
capture consumers’ attention and information-processing time.”). 
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technology to aid us.13 Many ads are functionally invisible, 
triggering no reaction at all in our brains because we’ve 
prescreened them, never allowing them to impinge on our 
thoughts.14 
Barron suggested that greater access to mainstream 
channels of communication would help solve the problem of 
the rioting dissenter, but that doesn’t seem likely. As his 
own reference to the plethora of modern “attention-getting 
devices” indicated, there are many more speakers who want 
our attention than we have attention, not to mention desire 
to listen. The scarcity is not in our stars—or star 
reporters—but in ourselves.15 Barron’s escalation argument, 
taken seriously, is deeply unsettling. There doesn’t seem to 
be a way backwards, other than to abandon modern society 
and technology. Perhaps we will all develop near-
impenetrable filters, armor-plating our attention.16 But 
those filters are likely to screen out plenty of useful 
information as well, thus avoiding the tragedy of the mental 
commons only by preventing many productive encounters. 
Because people react unpredictably and often creatively to 
  
 13. Fred von Lohmann, It’s My Browser, and I’ll Auto-Click if I Want To, 
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., Oct. 9, 2009, http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/ 
2009/10/its-my-browser-and-ill-auto-click-if-i-want. 
 14. See Rebecca Tushnet, Gone in 60 Milliseconds: Trademark Law and 
Cognitive Science, 86 TEX. L. REV. 507, 547 (2008) (“[N]ew neuroscience studies 
provide evidence for advertisers’ long-held belief that much advertising is 
completely useless. In MRI studies, ‘a third to a half of commercials do not 
generate any brain reaction at all.’”) (footnote omitted). 
 15. See Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of 
Freedom of Expression for The Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 7 (2004) 
(“The digital revolution made a different kind of scarcity salient. It is not the 
scarcity of bandwidth but the scarcity of audiences, and, in particular, scarcity 
of audience attention. . . . [A]s the costs of distribution of speech are lowered, 
and more and more people can reach each other easily and cheaply, the 
competition for audience attention has grown ever more fervent.”) (footnote 
omitted). 
 16. Cf. Goldman, Coasean Marketing, supra note 5, at 1202-09 (discussing 
the possibility of personalized technology that allows through only ads of 
interest to the recipient). Goldman’s proposal is intriguing, but it has problems 
(as most accounts of choices to seek out or receive information do) with 
preference formation, as discussed infra Section III.B.3. When people don’t 
know what they will want, they are likely to make blanket choices such as 
screening out all ads, to the great dismay of advertisers. See Noam Cohen, 
Whiting Out the Ads, but at What Cost?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 2007, at C3. 
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their cultural environments, assembling bits and pieces of 
information from various sources,17 it is hard to predict 
what a world of successful attention self-defense would look 
like, or even how to value it. 
What I want to focus on is not Barron’s proposal to 
allow dissenters greater access to the means of publication 
and even a right of reply to mainstream speakers18—
arguably, the Internet has accomplished much of what he 
could hope for on that front—but what Barron left out. 
Crucially, Barron omitted advertising from his class of 
constitutionally relevant speech. Coke would have no right 
to reply to a Pepsi ad specifically targeting it, nor to an 
editorial condemning soda’s role in promoting obesity. 
Writing as he was before the Supreme Court granted more 
than minimal protection to commercial speech, Barron 
analogized from ads to mass media in a way now far outside 
the mainstream of constitutional argument: because the 
mass media is profit-oriented and largely content-
indifferent, even its editorial aspects should be treated as 
commercial speech and subjected to extensive government 
regulation, at least about topic choice.19 
Barron’s treatment of commercial speech is of particular 
interest because his theory is based on listeners’ interests in 
hearing all that is worthy of being said, and that is also the 
core justification for modern commercial speech doctrine.20 
  
 17. See Julie E. Cohen, Creativity and Culture in Copyright Theory, 40 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 1151, 1189 (2007).  
    18.  See Barron, supra note 1, at 1660. 
 19. See id. at 1660-63; see also id. at 1668 (“Indeed, it has long been held that 
commercial advertising is not the type of speech protected by the first 
amendment, and hence even an abandonment of the romantic view of the first 
amendment and adoption of a purposive approach would not entitle an 
individual to require publication of commercial material.”) (footnote omitted). 
 20. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985) 
(“[T]he extension of First Amendment protection to commercial speech is 
justified principally by the value to consumers of the information such speech 
provides.”) (citation omitted); see also Tom Bennigson, Nike Revisited: Can 
Commercial Corporations Engage In Non-Commercial Speech?, 39 CONN. L. REV. 
379 (2006) (arguing in favor of the original audience-based rationale for 
commercial speech doctrine); Burt Neuborne, The First Amendment and 
Government Regulation of Capital Markets, 55 BROOK. L. REV. 5 (1989) 
(promoting a “hearer-centered” concept of the First Amendment); Robert Post, 
The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1, 14-15 
(2000) [hereinafter Post, Constitutional Status] (“[The Court has] focused its 
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In Virginia Pharmacy, the Supreme Court appealed to 
consumer-citizens’ interests in receiving relevant 
information to justify striking down a state rule that barred 
price advertising for prescription drugs.21 Even if the 
pharmacies had no right to speak, consumers had the right 
to hear what they had to say. In this view, commercial and 
corporate speakers may provide information and 
perspectives that the audience would not otherwise 
receive.22 At the same time, because the right to speak is 
dependent on the audience’s interest (both in the sense of 
desire and in the sense of entitlement) in receiving useful 
information, this theory does not protect commercial speech 
as strongly as political speech. For example, commercial 
speakers can be forced to disclose relevant information to 
avoid consumer deception, a topic to which I will return in 
Part II.23 
  
[commercial speech] analysis on the need to receive information, rather than on 
the rights of speakers.”); David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom 
of Expression, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 334, 353-60 (1991) (arguing that the concept of 
listener autonomy explains much First Amendment law); cf. Robert Post, 
Transparent and Efficient Markets: Compelled Commercial Speech and Coerced 
Commercial Association in United Foods, Zauderer, and Abood, 40 VAL. U. L. 
REV. 555 passim (2006) (discussing the Supreme Court’s recent shift towards 
more speaker-focused justifications for protecting commercial speech, and the 
doctrinal problems created thereby).  
 21. Va. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 
748, 763-64 (1976); see also, e.g., 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 
496 (1996) (plurality opinion) (“[T]he same interest that supports regulation of 
potentially misleading advertising, namely, the public’s interest in receiving 
accurate commercial information, also supports an interpretation of the First 
Amendment that provides constitutional protection for the dissemination of 
accurate and nonmisleading commercial messages.”); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. 
Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980) (explaining that 
commercial speech receives constitutional protection because of its 
informational function). 
 22. Cf. Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 
1405, 1411 (1986). 
 23. See, e.g., Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651 (“Because the extension of First 
Amendment protection to commercial speech is justified principally by the value 
to consumers of the information such speech provides, [an advertiser’s] 
constitutionally protected interest in not providing any particular factual 
information in his advertising is minimal.”) (citation omitted). As product 
placement and other forms of stealth advertising become more common, the line 
between commercial speech and mass media productions in general becomes 
more blurred, in ways that support Barron’s contention that mass media are 
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Audience-focused theories can produce such 
diametrically opposed results—nonexistent or robust 
protection for advertising—because the audience’s interests 
can be defined in multiple ways. The audience doesn’t 
necessarily know what it wants. Worse, it might want 
different things depending on what it hears. The same 
might theoretically be true of speakers, but First 
Amendment theorists have generally been satisfied with 
assuming that speakers know, when they start to talk, what 
they want to say. Thus, speakers’ interests can simply be 
defined as interests in communicating their selected 
messages. At most, speakers may be understood to have an 
additional interest in being heard, as Barron emphasized, 
but it has always seemed obvious that speakers know what 
they want to say.  
By contrast, the question of what audiences want, or 
deserve, to see and hear offers much more room for debate. 
In a reversal of Barron’s critique, Cass Sunstein has drawn 
on the audience-interest tradition to argue for forced 
exposure to competing views. In a world where mass media 
are not especially powerful, he contends, audiences should 
be exposed to multiple competing viewpoints, so that they 
do not get lost in an echo chamber that only reinforces their 
preexisting prejudices.24 Regardless of the merits of 
Sunstein’s proposal, participants in modern information 
environments can’t possibly consume all the information 
available to them, or even a tiny subset of it. Access alone 
will never be enough. Speakers will always have incentives 
to seek more attention than audiences want to give them.  
  
essentially profit-seeking and indifferent to content and therefore can be 
regulated in the service of democratic self-government. See Goodman, supra 
note 11, at 89-96, 152 (arguing for mandatory disclosure of commercial 
sponsorship in nontraditional promotional contexts such as product placement, 
news story placement, and “astroturf” grass-roots word-of-mouth marketing 
campaigns). Evoking the same audience-focused justifications as Barron did, 
Goodman writes that “[m]andated source disclosure is the kind of government 
intervention in speech markets that the public rights theory of the First 
Amendment supports.” Id. at 131. 
 24. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM 2.0 110-20 (2007). Others criticize 
Sunstein’s argument on various grounds and point out that audience members 
may seek out different perspectives on their own initiative. E.g., YOCHAI 
BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS 
MARKETS AND FREEDOM 238-39 (2006). 
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Given an audience-focused justification for commercial 
speech doctrine, audiences’ dogged attempts to evade or 
ignore advertising suggest that even if audiences have 
rights to receive desired information that the state would 
prefer to suppress, such rights can’t support an advertiser’s 
claim of a right to provide information in which consumers 
have expressed no interest.25 An audience-focused theory 
might then propose limits on speech designed simply to 
attract attention the audience doesn’t want to give but 
(perhaps for cognitive/perceptual reasons) can’t avoid. These 
limits would be analogous to conventional volume 
restrictions—the classic ban on loudspeaker trucks in 
residential neighborhoods.26 The theory would be that 
attempts to change the audience’s preferences through 
ambush or camouflage are illegitimate even if they are 
ultimately successful in selling products.27 This underlies 
proposals to help audiences identify advertiser-sponsored 
speech and, if they choose, avoid or discount it. 
Such proposals react to a classic problem of imperfect 
information. In practice, we manage our attention grossly, 
unable or unwilling to discriminate on content before we’ve 
already been exposed to a particular advertising message. 
We are vulnerable to attempts to evade our existing rules of 
thumb for avoiding ads. As a result, advertisers are 
attracted to methods that don’t let audiences know an ad is 
coming, such as sponsored product placement in traditional 
forms of entertainment and surprising ad formats or 
content.  
Just as our filters can be defeated by new forms of 
advertising, so too can First Amendment doctrine. 
Commercial speech regulation requires reshaping in the 
new world where new forms of ads compete for our 
  
 25. See Bennigson, supra note 20, at 422-23. 
    26. See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (upholding prohibitions against 
loudspeakers in residential areas). 
 27. Cf. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 389 (1965) 
(“In each [case of prohibited false advertising or trademark infringement] the 
seller has used a misrepresentation to break down what he regards to be an 
annoying or irrational habit of the buying public . . . . In each case the seller 
reasons that when the habit is broken the buyer will be satisfied with the 
performance of the product he receives. Yet, a misrepresentation has been used 
to break the habit and . . . a misrepresentation for such an end is not 
permitted.”).  
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attention, focusing not just on the truth or falsity of 
advertising claims but also on whether consumers are 
aware of their exposure to advertising. Recently, legal 
scholarship has begun to address topics such as product 
placement in entertainment, proposing various ways to deal 
with advertising claims communicated through movies, 
television shows, and other forms traditionally understood 
as noncommercial speech, but there is little actual law on 
the subject.28 The next section considers existing doctrine on 
nontraditional advertising formats, which suggests that 
new formats will not defeat regulation. 
B. Regulating Unusual Advertising Formats as They 
Become Usual 
In broad strokes, devoting regulatory attention to new 
types of ads should not be hugely difficult under commercial 
speech doctrine. So far, courts have found commercial 
speech doctrine applicable to new ad formats, where the 
alternative would be to allow false and misleading 
commercial claims to be virtually immune from regulation. 
The Supreme Court’s last, failed attempt to engage the 
definition of commercial speech showed how new types of 
ads will either make commercial speech doctrine bend or 
break. In Nike v. Kasky,29 Nike responded to a concerted 
campaign against its labor practices with a variety of 
statements, some made to reporters, others published as 
“advertorials,” and still others included in letters to colleges 
attempting to dissuade them from severing sponsorship ties 
with Nike.30 Nike argued that its speech was political 
speech, in part because it did not appear in conventional 
advertising formats. The unusual format didn’t change the 
outcome: the California Supreme Court’s finding that Nike’s 
  
 28. See, e.g., Goodman, supra note 11; William Benjamin Lackey, Can Lois 
Lane Smoke Marlboros?: An Examination of the Constitutionality of Regulating 
Product Placement in Movies, 1993 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 275 (1993); Matthew 
Savare, Where Madison Avenue Meets Hollywood and Vine: The Business, Legal, 
and Creative Ramifications of Product Placements, 11 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 331 
(2004); Raghu Seshadri, Note, “Did You Want Fries with That?” The 
Unanswered Question of Federal Product Placement Regulation, 9 VAND. J. ENT. 
& TECH. L. 467 (2006). 
 29. 539 U.S. 654 (2003) (per curiam). 
    30. Id. at 656 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
732 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58 
statements constituted commercial speech was the final 
word in the case.31 The Supreme Court ultimately dismissed 
certiorari as improvidently granted, perhaps because any 
decision in favor of Nike would have shaken the foundations 
of advertising law.32  
Justice Breyer, dissenting from the Court’s decision to 
dismiss, concluded that the materials at issue in Nike were 
not commercial speech.33 He noted that they appeared 
outside of a traditional advertising format, focusing on a 
letter sent to numerous college presidents.34 The letter was, 
as he pointed out, different from a newspaper or television 
ad.35 But that was because the letter was directed to a much 
smaller audience than a newspaper or television show: 
people who controlled college athletic budgets. It sought the 
attention of exactly the people in a position to make 
significant purchasing decisions. False advertising law has 
had no difficulty finding similar letters to be commercial 
speech when they targeted small, specialized markets, and 
this makes perfect sense.36 Indeed, press releases have 
  
     31. Id. at 654. 
 32. See Rebecca Tushnet, Fighting Freestyle: The First Amendment, Fairness, 
and Corporate Reputation, 50 B.C. L.  REV. 1457, 1465 (2009). 
    33. Nike, 539 U.S. at 676 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
    34. Id. at 676-77. 
    35. Id. at 677. 
 36. See, e.g., Coastal Abstract Serv., Inc. v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 173 F.3d 
725, 735 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that where the relevant market consists of only 
a limited number of potential purchasers, a promotional presentation to a single 
customer may qualify as false advertising); Champion Labs. v. Parker-Hannifin 
Corp., 616 F. Supp. 2d 684 (E.D. Mich. 2009) (holding that a presentation to a 
single large client could be commercial advertising and promotion); Mobius 
Mgmt. Sys., Inc. v. Fourth Dimension Software, Inc., 880 F. Supp. 1005, 1019-20 
(S.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding that a letter to a single customer may be commercial 
advertising); cf. Birthright v. Birthright, Inc., 827 F. Supp. 1114, 1137-38 
(D.N.J. 1993) (holding that a nonprofit organization’s unlicensed use of 
trademark in fund-raising letters constituted false advertising). But see Ultra-
Temp Corp. v. Advanced Vacuum Sys., Inc., 27 F. Supp. 2d 86, 92-93 (D. Mass. 
1998) (holding that a letter to a single customer is not advertising); Garland Co. 
v. Ecology Roof Sys. Corp., 895 F. Supp. 274, 279 (D. Kan. 1995) (same); 
Goldsmith v. Polygram Diversified Ventures, Inc., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 
1326 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (same); Am. Needle & Novelty Inc. v. Drew Pearson Mktg., 
Inc., 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1059, 1062-63 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (same). 
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latterly become common targets in false advertising cases,37 
and have also played important roles in securities fraud 
cases.38 Similarly, direct mail, distribution of article 
reprints,39 business cards,40 seminars,41 statements to trade 
  
 37. See, e.g., Porous Media Corp. v. Pall Corp., 201 F.3d 1058 (8th Cir. 2000); 
Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997); Star-Brite 
Distrib., Inc. v. Kop-Coat, Inc., No. 09-60812-CIV., 2010 WL 750353 (S.D. Fla. 
Mar. 4, 2010); Innovation Ventures, LLC v. Body Dynamics, Inc., No. 08-12711, 
2009 WL 877640 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 30, 2009); Lawman Armor Corp. v. Master 
Lock Co., No. Civ. A. 02-6605, 2004 WL 362210 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 27, 2004); Enzo 
Life Scis., Inc. v. Digene Corp., 295 F. Supp. 2d 424 (D. Del. 2003); Fedders 
Corp. v. Elite Classics, 268 F. Supp. 2d 1051 (S.D. Ill. 2003); Carell v. Shubert 
Org., Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 236 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); First Health Group Corp. v. 
United Payors, No. 96 C 2518, 2000 WL 549723 (N.D. Ill. May 2, 2000); Ferrer v. 
Maychick, 69 F. Supp. 2d 495, 496 & n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Summit Tech., Inc. v. 
High-Line Med. Instruments, Co., 933 F. Supp. 918, 936 (C.D. Cal. 1996); 
Interactive Network, Inc. v. NTN Commc’ns, Inc., 875 F. Supp. 1398, 1410 (N.D. 
Cal. 1995); In re Century 21-RE/MAX Real Estate Adver. Claims Litig., 882 F. 
Supp. 915, 929 (C.D. Cal. 1994); see also 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(l)(1)-(2) (2009) 
(treating press releases regarding FDA-approved drugs and devices as 
promotional labeling); Nancy L. Buc, FDA Regulation of Food, Drug, Cosmetic, 
and Device Promotion, in ADVERTISING LAW IN THE NEW MEDIA AGE 361, 366-67 
(1999) (discussing FDA assertions of authority over press releases and 
fundraising letters featuring products in development). But see Procter & 
Gamble Co. v. Haugen, 179 F.R.D. 622, 634 (D. Utah 1998) (holding that 
statements about litigation in press releases were not closely enough connected 
to the sale of goods to constitute advertising or promotion within the meaning of 
the Lanham Act); Gordon & Breach Sci. Publishers S.A. v. Am. Inst. of Physics, 
859 F. Supp. 1521, 1532-33 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (finding that published surveys 
claiming that publisher’s scientific journals were more heavily cited than other 
publishers’ and press release about surveys did not constitute “commercial 
advertising or promotion” and underlying surveys were fully protected by the 
First Amendment). As Procter & Gamble and Gordon & Breach indicate, it is 
the substance of the claim and not the presence of the claim in a communication 
designated a “press release” that controls courts’ resolution of false advertising 
issues. 
 38. See, e.g., Marsh Group v. Prime Retail, Inc., 46 F. App’x 140, 142-43, 145 
(4th Cir. 2002); ABC Arbitrage Plaintiffs Group v. Tchuruk, 291 F.3d 336, 342, 
347-48 (5th Cir. 2002); Nathenson v. Zonagen, Inc., 267 F.3d 400, 418, 424-25 
(5th Cir. 2001); Ganino v. Citizens Utils. Co., 228 F.3d 154, 159 (2d Cir. 2000); 
Semerenko v. Cendant Corp., 223 F.3d 165, 170-71 (3d Cir. 2000); Stevelman v. 
Alias Research Inc., 174 F.3d 79, 81 (2d Cir. 1999); In re PLC Sys., Inc. Sec. 
Litig., 41 F. Supp. 2d 106, 108 (D. Mass. 1999); In re Biogen Sec. Litig., 179 
F.R.D. 25, 32-33, 36-37 (D. Mass. 1997). 
 39. See Semco, Inc. v. Amcast, Inc., 52 F.3d 108, 113 (6th Cir. 1995) 
(reversing grant of summary judgment where article reprints containing false 
claims were distributed at trade shows); Gordon & Breach Sci. Publishers S.A., 
 
734 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58 
publications,42 and individual presentations by salespeople43 
have been regulated under false advertising law. The FDA 
regulates everything it calls “labeling,” which includes 
calendars, films, and the Physicians’ Desk Reference,44 and 
also regulates what researchers involved in clinical trials of 
  
859 F. Supp. at 1532-45 (finding that dissemination of reprints of comparative 
survey constituted commercial speech); see also Fed. Trade Comm’n, Informal 
Staff Advisory Op. 97-5 (July 31, 1997), http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/franchise/advops/ 
advis97-5.htm (stating that reprints of media articles about franchisor’s 
earnings are likely to be subject to FTC’s franchise disclosure rules if franchisor 
gives them to potential franchisee); “By disseminating copies of the news article 
. . . the franchisor effectively ratifies the journalist’s words as its own and, in so 
doing, converts the article into an advertising piece . . . .”. Id. But see Nat’l Life 
Ins. Co. v. Phillips Publ’g, Inc., 793 F. Supp. 627, 644-45 & n.33 (D. Md. 1992) 
(finding advertisements accurately reporting portions of a newsletter were not 
commercial speech because they were not included to aid in sale of product, but 
rather as a comment on public controversy). 
 40. See Avon Prods., Inc. v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 984 F. Supp. 768, 796 
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (finding that manufacturer’s dissemination of such things as 
business cards constituted advertising or promotion under the Lanham Act). 
 41. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Sage Seminars, Inc., No. C 95-2854 SBA, 1995 
WL 798938, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 1995) (finding representations made at 
seminars given throughout U.S. were “in or affecting commerce” for purposes of 
FTC Act). 
 42. See Fuente Cigar, Ltd. v. Opus One, 985 F. Supp. 1448, 1456 (M.D. Fla. 
1997) (finding that statement to trade publication, directed toward contested 
consumers, constituted advertising or promotion); Connick v. Suzuki Motor Co., 
675 N.E.2d 584, 594-95 (Ill. 1996) (finding a car manufacturer’s statement to 
Car & Driver magazine that manufacturer knew would appear as part of an 
automotive review could constitute consumer fraud under Illinois law); see also 
Semco, 52 F.3d at 113 (finding a trade journal article written by the defendant’s 
president primarily to tout the defendant’s goods was commercial speech). 
 43. See Avon Prods., 984 F. Supp. at 776-78, 795 (addressing product claims 
made by individual Avon sales representatives); Gordon & Breach Sci. 
Publishers S.A. v. Am. Inst. of Physics, 905 F. Supp. 169, 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) 
(finding that presentations addressed to relevant consumers were 
“advertising”); Nat’l Artists Mgmt. Co. v. Weaving, 769 F. Supp. 1224, 1235 
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (denying a motion to dismiss a false advertising claim because 
telephone conversations with friends and colleagues can constitute advertising 
in particular industries). 
 44. See 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(l)(2) (2009) (“Brochures, booklets, mailing pieces, 
detailing pieces, file cards, bulletins, calendars, price lists, catalogs, house 
organs, letters, motion picture films, film strips, lantern slides, sound 
recordings, exhibits, literature . . . and references published (for example, the 
‘Physicians Desk Reference’) for use by medical practitioners . . . are hereby 
determined to be labeling.”). 
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unapproved drugs can say to doctors and reporters.45 Drug 
companies sponsor studies that they hope to have published 
in peer-reviewed journals, then use those studies for their 
own marketing purposes, drawing regulatory responses.46  
In other words, accepting Justice Breyer’s objection 
would have thrown into question a broad range of existing 
advertising regulation and case law. Justice Breyer offered 
no reason to have a small-market or press release exception 
to the law.47 Nor was Justice Breyer’s general attention to 
format appropriate, especially in a world in which 
advertising can take any form we can conceive and probably 
some we can’t.48 The press releases that formed part of the 
challenged materials in Nike are increasingly standard 
means of communicating directly with consumers, as 
companies know that material in their press releases will 
often be passed on without alteration by reporters49 or read 
  
 45. See Natasha Singer, F.D.A. Aims at Doctors’ Drug Pitches, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 1, 2010, at B1. 
 46. For an example of study manipulation that ultimately resulted in a false 
advertising lawsuit, see Bracco Diagnostics, Inc. v. Amersham Health, Inc., 627 
F. Supp. 2d 384 (D.N.J. 2009). While a study that was supposed to prove a 
product’s superiority was ongoing, the product’s advertiser took “secret and 
forbidden peeks at the data looking for trends, and even changed the study 
endpoints and stopped the study early in response.” Id. at 409. When a New 
England Journal of Medicine (“NEJM”) reviewer asked if there had been an 
interim analysis, the advertiser and the individual authors denied it, then 
amended the article to include their false denial. Id. The court was not 
impressed by the fact that the advertiser’s marketing director “provided input to 
the NEJM article to try to make it misleading, and then celebrated the final 
version’s obscuring of the limitation of the results of the study . . . and its overly 
broad and unsupportable conclusion.” Id.  
 47. One might argue that targeted messages pose less of a risk of polluting 
the information commons. It’s not amount of information but quality, however, 
with which false advertising law is concerned. Cf. Post, Constitutional Status, 
supra note 20, at 47-49 (arguing that private commercial speech should be more 
subject to regulation because it does not participate in public reason). 
 48. See, e.g., Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who’s Afraid of Commercial 
Speech?, 76 VA. L. REV. 627, 640-41, 643-44 (1990); Lynette Holloway, Hip-Hop 
Sales Pop: Pass the Courvoisier and Count the Cash, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2002, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/09/02/business/media-hip-hop-sales-pop-pass-the-
courvoisier-and-count-the-cash.html?pagewanted=1 (reporting on the economic 
relationship between some rappers’ music and videos and commercial products 
featured therein).  
 49. See “Picking Up” a Press Release Takes on New Meaning, PR NEWS, Aug. 
26, 2002; Ned Steele, Interactive Press Releases on Web Change PR, Media 
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directly by consumers.50 Nike’s letter nominally to a 
newspaper editor included statements directed at readers in 
their capacity as purchasers, including “[d]uring the 
shopping season, we encourage shoppers to remember that 
Nike is the industry’s leader in improving factory 
conditions.”51 There is also a persuasive advantage to using 
non-ad formats: though ads are regularly screened by 
conventional publishers and broadcasters to ensure that 
they meet minimal standards, press releases and other 
promotional materials that are passed through untouched 
are perceived by consumers as having survived a vetting 
process, and thus as being credible.52 It is therefore neither 
  
Landscape, O’Dwyer’s PR Services Report, Feb. 2001, at 39 (“It’s a commonly 
known ‘dirty little secret’ of journalism and PR that press releases too often get 
lifted whole, sometimes under a reporter’s byline, and published with scant, if 
any, editing or fact-checking.”); cf. Brooks Barnes, Ad Budget Tight? Call the 
P.R. Machine, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2009, at BU7 (discussing the use of press 
releases and other public relations activity to market movies). “Paramount 
Pictures did not buy a single billboard to promote ‘Paranormal Activity,’ its 
recent horror film. The studio also saved tens of millions of dollars by forgoing a 
national television campaign. Instead, Paramount depended on its publicity arm 
to fan interest on blogs and in traditional media. The flack attack worked: the 
film, made for just $10,000, has sold $104 million in tickets.” Id. I am indebted 
to Seth Oltman for his research on the use of press releases to communicate 
directly with consumers. 
 50. See Steele, supra note 49, at 39. Yahoo!, for example, now mixes in press 
releases with other news for general readers. And Sears’ press release titled 
“Don’t Miss Deals on Holiday Gifts for the Entire Family” is plainly addressed to 
customers, not reporters. See Press Release, Sears, Don't Miss Deals on Holiday 
Gifts for the Entire Family (Dec. 11, 2003), available at 
http://www.prnewswire.com/cgi-bin/micro_stories.pl?ACCT=116376&TICK=  
SEARS&STORY=/www/story/12-11-2003/0002074155&EDATE=Dec+11,+2003. 
A similar press release, “Practical Meets Romance: Think Outside of the Candy 
Box This Valentine’s Day,” uses phrases such as “You’ll feel the love,” “Wow 
your significant other, your mom or your daughter,” and “Put a little power in 
your man’s hand.” Press Release, Sears, Practical Meets Romance: Think 
Outside of the Candy Box This Valentine’s Day (Feb. 6, 2004), available at  
http://www.prnewswire.com/cgi-bin/micro_stories.pl?ACCT=116376&TICK= 
SEARS&STORY=/www/story/02-06-2004/0002104638&EDATE=Feb+6,+2004. 
 51. Kasky v. Nike, 45 P.3d 243, 258 (Cal. 2002). 
 52. See Barnes, supra note 49 (“‘At least with publicity—placed stories—
there is a feeling that the message has gone through a filter,’ said Paul Pflug, 
the co-owner of Principal Communications, a public relations firm that 
specializes in entertainment. ‘Journalists and their editors had to consider the 
pitch worthy of space. The message has been vetted in some way.’ He said an 
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unsurprising nor unfair that false advertising law as it 
stands applies commercial speech rules to multiple 
advertising formats. 
The rise of product placement is likely to lead to further 
disputes about what communications to the public can 
legitimately be regulated by consumer protection law. To 
date, courts have correctly rejected several trademark 
infringement lawsuits by manufacturers who didn’t pay for 
placement in a movie. The manufacturers alleged that 
consumers would be confused and their brand images 
harmed by negative portrayals in the movies.53 But when a 
product is lauded because the advertiser paid for the 
encomium and consumers are deceived about some 
characteristic of that product, courts will either have to 
subject entertainment media to advertising law under the 
aegis of the Lanham Act and state consumer protection law, 
or open up a fairly substantial loophole in advertising 
regulation.54 As the developing case law on press releases 
indicates, it is both likely and desirable that the First 
Amendment will not pose a generalized barrier to pursuing 
false advertising wherever it goes. 
  
article was more valuable to the studios because it is more credible to viewers 
than an ad.”). 
 53. See Caterpillar Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 287 F. Supp. 2d 913, 919-20, 923 
(C.D. Ill. 2003) (rejecting trademark infringement claim where there were no 
competing or inauthentic trademarks at issue); WHAM-O, Inc. v. Paramount 
Pictures Corp., 286 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 1262-63 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (rejecting 
trademark infringement claim because the plaintiff did not demonstrate likely 
audience confusion). But see Am. Dairy Queen Corp. v. New Line Prods., Inc., 35 
F. Supp. 2d 727, 730-32, 735 (D. Minn. 1998) (enjoining film company from 
using Dairy Queen name because of potential customer confusion).  
 54. Deception about whether Coke paid for placement is another question, 
addressed further below. There is no sound justification for the claim that, when 
Coke didn’t pay for placement but consumers think that it permitted the 
presence of its products in a movie, book, etc., Coke is harmed. See Mark A. 
Lemley & Mark McKenna, Irrelevant Confusion, 62 STAN. L. REV. 413, 434-36 
(2010). Trademark owners would nonetheless like courts to believe that 
unauthorized portrayals of their marks cause actionable harm. This article’s 
main focus is on undisclosed-but-extant economic connections, essentially the 
flipside of unauthorized uses. One side benefit of a robust disclosure rule, 
however, would be to make trademark owners’ claims against expressive 
unauthorized uses even less persuasive by  making it even more unreasonable 
for consumers to assume that mere mention or portrayal of a trademark, 
without explicit sponsorship information, indicates any relationship between the 
speaker and the trademark owner. See generally id. 
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II. THE DEVIL’S IN THE DETAILS (AND IN THE 
COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT): VOLUNTEERS AND THE 
CHALLENGE THEY POSE TO ADVERTISING REGULATION 
Product placement, letters to the editor, and press 
releases involve nontraditional uses of mass media to 
disseminate promotional messages. But there are many 
other emerging marketing tactics. Volunteers from the 
audience can also serve as shills. This has happened 
accidentally—fans create works that advertisers then adopt, 
as with the immensely popular short films showing two men 
creating elaborate fountains powered by the chemical 
interactions caused by Mentos dropped into bottles of Diet 
Coke. These films were first disavowed, then embraced, by 
the manufacturers of the candy and soda.55  
Volunteer salespeople have also emerged by design, 
with traditional marketers soliciting user-generated ads for 
their products and showcasing the most persuasive ones in 
various ways. Ellen Goodman explains how this unsettles 
traditional false advertising law: 
The regulation of false advertising . . . was designed to manage 
information flows in relatively controlled environments where 
few speakers were capable of mass communication. . . . [F]alse 
advertising law assumes a model in which authorship is 
singular or several, not massively composite. In the 
environment of peer production, by contrast, all are capable of 
mass communication and authorship is frequently cumulative 
as users remix and mash up information provided by others.56 
Uncertainty about whether an advertiser or an 
unaffiliated individual is speaking is particularly 
problematic on a doctrinal level because individual speakers 
can generally make false claims about products, as long as 
they are not defamatory and do not otherwise present a 
clear and present danger of harm. Traditional advertisers 
are governed by quite different rules holding them strictly 
liable for falsehoods and requiring them to possess 
substantiation for any material claims.57  
  
 55. See Ellen P. Goodman, Peer Promotions and False Advertising Law, 58 
S.C. L. REV. 683, 684 (2007) (“[T]he power to disseminate brand-related 
messages is now widely distributed.”). 
 56. Id. at 685 (citation omitted). 
 57. Tushnet, supra note 32, at 1465-66, 1470. 
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Individuals have always been able to say things about 
unrelated companies, but the growing regulatory problem is 
one posed by the increasing visibility and potential reach of 
such speech. Riffing off popular cultural artifacts is a classic 
way to get attention. Before cheap streaming Internet video, 
it was difficult to get one’s fifteen minutes of fame by 
creating an ad; now, as the Mentos/Diet Coke films reveal, 
it is a reasonable path to acclaim. New media structures 
thus encourage and allow for wide distribution of a variety 
of user-created promotional messages, though only a few 
become hits.  
As a result, volunteers may now be able to disseminate 
misleading claims about products to millions, subject to 
minimal or no regulation. In order to mitigate some of the 
harm, we might conclude that advertisers should not be 
allowed to boost the volunteer signal unless the message 
follows the rules to which advertisers themselves are 
subject. Ellen Goodman thus argues that advertisers should 
be subject to ordinary advertising regulation when they 
adopt user-generated promotional material as their own.58  
I am sympathetic to this argument, but it would likely 
require a change in the law. Section 230 of the 
Communications Decency Act, designed to protect Internet 
service providers against massive potential liability for 
users’ defamatory speech, apparently immunizes 
advertisers against false advertising claims when they 
adopt and promote user-generated ads online. Section 230 
reads in relevant part, “No provider or user of an interactive 
computer service shall be treated as the publisher or 
speaker of any information provided by another information 
content provider.”59  
Section 230 has mainly been used in non-advertising 
cases, and it is still unclear how it will affect user-generated 
  
 58. See Goodman, supra note 55, at 703 (“Once a brand owner adopts the peer 
promotion as its own, featuring the promotion on its web site or distributing it 
by other means, this speech should be considered the brand owner’s 
advertisement. That the sponsor has chosen to use an amateur instead of an 
agency to produce its advertisements should not change the analysis. Moreover, 
under the Lanham Act case law, it should not make a difference whether the 
brand owner initially solicited the ads or simply adopted them later. In either 
case, the brand owner is sponsoring speech for promotional purposes.”) (footnote 
omitted).  
    59. 47 U.S.C § 230(c)(1) (2006). 
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advertising. In one case, Quiznos ran a contest for 
homemade ads, and the rules required “‘a comparison 
between Quiznos and Subway with Quiznos being 
superior.’”60 Quiznos posted its favorite ads online. Subway 
sued, and Quiznos argued that it was just facilitating 
consumer-generated ads, which was protected by section 
230. The court first treated section 230 as an affirmative 
defense, ruling that Quiznos’ claim couldn’t be decided on a 
motion to dismiss,61 then denied summary judgment on the 
ground that it was still uncertain whether Quiznos was 
“actively responsible for the creation and development of 
disparaging representations about Subway contained in the 
contestant videos.”62 However, immunity from posting user-
generated ads on a website or YouTube channel should 
follow as a matter of statutory interpretation if the 
advertisers are not the source of false claims but only 
disseminated claims made by another.63  
It’s true that Congress didn’t contemplate advertiser 
selection of others’ content for commercial benefit. The 
model was AOL the web host, not AOL the advertiser 
holding a contest for the best user-generated ad for AOL 
services. Nonetheless, the user appears to be a separate 
information provider, triggering section 230 in both cases, 
because the language of the law distinguishes based on the 
identity of the information provider, not on the motive for 
its dissemination. 
Another attempt to regulate advertiser adoption of 
others’ speech comes from a recent opinion of the South 
Carolina Ethics Bar. State bars have been struggling to deal 
with lawyers’ Internet advertising, which can reach 
potential clients in new ways. Anything on the Internet, not 
just a banner ad, might in theory count as advertising. And 
new intermediaries have sprung up to help potential clients 
  
 60. Louise Story, Can a Sandwich Be Slandered?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2008, 
at C1.  
 61. Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. QIP Holders, LLC, No. 3:06-cv-1710, 2007 WL 
1186026, at *2 (D. Conn. Apr. 19, 2007).  
    62. Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. QIP Holder LLC, No. 3:06-cv-1710, 2010 WL 
669870, at *23 (D. Conn. Feb. 19, 2010). 
 63. If the advertiser only selects the best ads, it should be entitled to section 
230 immunity. Cf. Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1118-19 (9th 
Cir. 2007) (finding section 230 immunity from secondary liability for ISPs for 
state-law false advertising claims).  
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find lawyers, including lawyer rating services that offer 
profiles of lawyers. Sometimes for a fee, lawyers can “claim” 
their profiles and add extra information to make themselves 
more attractive. The South Carolina ethics body ruled that, 
when a lawyer claims a profile on such a service, she 
becomes responsible for its entire content.64 But section 230 
by its terms prevents states from such attributions unless 
the user herself—here, the lawyer—provides the content at 
issue. The ethics body specifically stated that it was relying 
on the opposite rule, holding the lawyer responsible for 
statements of others,65 including peer endorsements, the 
service’s ratings, and client comments.66 Unless the provider 
  
 64. See South Carolina Bar, Ethics Advisory Op. 09-10, 
http://www.scbar.org/member_resources/ethics_advisory_opinions/&id=678 
(analogizing the situation to one in which a client had, without the lawyer’s 
knowledge, created an ad for the lawyer; once the lawyer became aware of the 
ad, it was required to make sure that the ad conformed to the ethics rules) 
[hereinafter Ethics Advisory Op.]; When Lawyers ‘Claim’ Online Profiles, Rules 
on Communications, Advertising Apply, 14 Electronic Com. & L. Rep. (BNA) 
1668 (Nov. 18, 2009) (“According to the committee, ‘to “claim” one’s website 
listing is to “place or disseminate” all communications made at or through that 
listing after the time the listing is claimed.’ That step makes the lawyer 
responsible for the information in the listing, it said. ‘Likewise, a lawyer who 
adopts or endorses information on any similar web site becomes responsible for 
conforming all information in the lawyer’s listing to the Rules of Professional 
Conduct,’ the committee stated . . . . [A] lawyer assumes responsibility for the 
content by requesting access to and updating it, beyond merely making 
corrections to directory information.”) [hereinafter When Lawyers ‘Claim’ Online 
Profiles]. 
 65. See When Lawyers ‘Claim’ Online Profiles, supra note 64 (“[The 
committee] reminded lawyers to adhere to Rule 8.4(a), which prohibits lawyers 
from violating professional conduct rules through the acts of another. ‘Therefore, 
a lawyer should monitor a “claimed” listing to keep all comments in conformity 
with the Rules,’ the opinion states. If any part of the listing is improper and 
cannot be removed, the lawyer should remove her entire listing, the committee 
said.”). 
 66. The committee analyzed each of these elements separately and held that 
the ethics rules applied to all of them, even though the lawyer did not provide 
them. See Ethics Advisory Op., supra note 64 (“[A] lawyer may claim the website 
listing, but all information contained therein (including peer endorsements, 
client ratings, and Company X ratings) are subject to the rules governing 
communication and advertising once the lawyer claims the listing. . . . A lawyer 
may invite peers to rate the lawyer and may invite and allow the posting of peer 
and client comments, but . . . the lawyer is responsible for their content.”); When 
Lawyers ‘Claim’ Online Profiles, supra note 64 (“‘The committee cautioned . . . 
that client comments may violate Rule 7.1 depending on their content. Rule 
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of the content is the lawyer’s agent, the ethics rules are 
preempted by federal law.67 
These conflicts are an example of the unanticipated 
consequences of new technologies and a very explicit 
demonstration of the way that background property and 
liability rules structure speech and speakers. Here the gap 
between created and adopted speech is especially large. In 
practice, 
the general population has more leeway to make [ads] that 
cross into murky territory. Consumer ads are sometimes 
offensive and crude, and they often exaggerate the benefits of 
the products made by the company that dangles the prize 
money. The sponsor can try to distance itself from the 
provocative content, while at the same time benefiting from the 
attention the videos draw to the brand.68  
This difference is then amplified by the legal regimes 
applied to advertiser speech versus those applied to 
consumer speech. Suppose a purely consumer-generated ad 
says false things about a major competitor. Section 230 
protects the manufacturer who hosts the ad on its website. 
In theory, the competitor can still go after the original 
consumer.69 But the competitor can’t take advantage of 
strict liability for simple falsity under the Lanham Act, the 
major source of private false advertising litigation, because 
the Lanham Act only applies to false advertising by parties 
in commercial competition with one another. The competitor 
will have to use state tort law, which generally has higher, 
defamation-like standards for liability. The consumer’s 
statement will likely be treated as fully protected 
  
7.1(d) prohibits a communication that ‘contains a testimonial,’ which the 
committee defined as a statement by a client about an experience with the 
lawyer. A lawyer should not solicit or allow publication of testimonials, the 
committee declared. Furthermore, the opinion states that [the rules] usually 
prohibit a client endorsement, which the committee characterized as ‘a more 
general recommendation or statement of approval of the lawyer.’”). 
 67. See infra Part III.C. It is possible that an appropriately tailored 
regulation might provide that, if a lawyer offered financial incentives for 
favorable client comments, the ethics rules would apply without interference by 
section 230, but that is a small subset of what the current rules purport to cover. 
 68. Story, supra note 60. 
 69. Even if the competitor wins a claim against the original speaker, 
however,  there is no obvious legal mechanism to compel the section 230-
immunized manufacturer to remove the ad. 
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noncommercial speech, actionable only on a showing of 
actual malice. And if the claim does not disparage the 
competitor but simply falsely lauds the manufacturer, the 
competitor may have no recourse at all. 
Under such circumstances, advertisers have every 
incentive to arbitrage the regulatory regime by burying 
their promotional speech within user-generated speech.70 If 
we simply equalized treatment, however, that would seem 
to sound the death knell for most advertising regulation, 
since it is unlikely that economically unrelated entities 
engaged in noncommercial speech can constitutionally be 
held strictly liable for falsity and required to substantiate 
product claims.  
The potential of user-generated ads to degrade (further) 
the integrity of information is illustrated by the remarks of 
one amateur filmmaker who submitted a video to the 
Quiznos contest: “‘Quiznos led you to believe it was O.K. to 
do it,’ [he] said. ‘It’s like mudslinging, in a sense. Like 
politicians slinging mud back and forth at each other. I took 
it that it was all fair in business.’”71 Effective advertising 
  
 70. See Goodman, supra note 55, at 686-87 (“Where brand owners sponsor 
peer promotions but conceal their involvement, the resulting communication 
mixes the commercial speech of the sponsor with the noncommercial speech of 
the peer.”); id. at 699 (“[P]eer promotions engage consumers in new ways by 
linking commercial and noncommercial speech.”); id. (“Peer promotions hide 
speaker identity. The determination of ‘commercialness’ requires examination 
not only of the content and context of speech, but also who is speaking and why. 
In other words, . . . the identity of the speaker[] becomes a matter of 
interpretation and investigation.”). 
 71. Story, supra note 60. One might speculate that the online environment 
also removes the inhibitions against defamatory behavior that speakers might 
otherwise have felt. Many people have observed the disinhibiting effects of 
online communication, which may also affect speakers’ willingness to engage in 
undisclosed marketing. Cf. Ken D. Kumayama, A Right to Pseudonymity, 51 
ARIZ. L. REV. 427, 448-49 (2009) (discussing ways in which online environments 
can facilitate antisocial behavior, including deception, and have both good and 
bad disinhibiting effects on individual expression); Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky & 
Thomas F. Cotter, Authorship, Audiences, and Anonymous Speech, 82 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1537, 1575 (2007) (“[T]he Internet has come to exacerbate this 
dark side of anonymity due to its ‘disinhibiting effect’ on many speakers. Studies 
show that even when an Internet user is not anonymous and knows the 
recipient of his e-mail message, the speaker is more likely to be disinhibited 
when engaged in “computer mediated communication” than in other types of 
communications. The technology separates the speaker from the immediate 
consequences of her speech, perhaps (falsely) lulling her to believe that there 
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regulation requires specific attention to new attention-
getting techniques, and might eventually require a revision 
of the CDA’s immunity provisions, at least for user-
generated promotional messages explicitly adopted or 
further disseminated by commercial sellers.72  
III. SPEAK FOR YOURSELF: ENDORSEMENT, PAYMENT AND 
DISCLOSURE IN NEW MEDIA 
A. The FTC Draws Lines Between Paid and Volunteer 
Content 
A related issue surrounding user-generated, advertiser-
friendly content recently arose when the FTC updated its 
endorsement and testimonial guidelines, which are 
consolidated administrative statutory interpretations 
intended to provide a basis for voluntary compliance. Along 
with other significant changes, the revised guidelines 
addressed social networking and other Internet media for 
the first time. The basic question was how to apply the 
FTC’s traditional disclosure and substantiation 
  
will be no consequences. Since the Internet magnifies the number of anonymous 
speakers, it also magnifies the likelihood of false and abusive speech.”) (footnote 
omitted); John Suler, The Online Disinhibition Effect, 7 CYBERPSYCHOLOGY & 
BEHAV. 321, 321-22 (2004) (setting forth arguments that the Internet decreases 
inhibitions on socially disapproved behavior).  
 72. There is already an analogy, though not a reassuring one, in 
pharmaceutical companies’ use of studies, journal articles, and lectures to 
“educate” doctors and thereby promote off-label use of FDA-approved drugs. 
Finding that companies have First Amendment rights to distribute others’ 
speech, several court decisions have proved extremely hostile to FDA 
regulations that limit such off-label promotions. See Washington Legal Found. 
v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 60-65 (D.D.C. 1998), further proceedings 36 F. 
Supp. 2d 16 (D.D.C. 1999), further proceedings sub nom. Washington Legal 
Found. v. Henney, 56 F. Supp. 2d 81 (D.D.C. 1999), vacated, 202 F.3d 331 (D.C. 
Cir. 2000). Such practices show how sellers can engage in arbitrage to defeat 
restrictions on what they can say directly. And arbitrage tends to break down; 
the maker of Botox has now filed suit to invalidate the regulations preventing it 
from engaging in off-label promotion directly. See Allergan v. United States, No. 
1:09-cv-01879 (D.D.C. filed Oct. 1, 2009); Brief for the National Spasmodic 
Torticollis Assoc. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Plantiff, Allergan v. United 
States, No. 1:09-cv-01879 (D.D.C. filed Oct. 1, 2009), available at 
http://www.wlf.org/Upload/litigation/briefs/112509Allergan_US_Amicus.pdf; 
Natasha Singer, Botox Maker’s Suit Cites Free Speech, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2009, 
at B3.    
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requirements to new media and new forms of endorsement. 
Applying already existing principles,73 the revised 
guidelines require: (1) substantiation for ad claims made by 
endorsers, even in new media, and (2) disclosure of any 
endorsement relationship that wouldn’t be obvious from 
context (as it is obvious when a spokesperson appears in a 
traditional 30-second TV ad). When a relationship between 
a blogger and an advertiser is of sufficient economic 
significance, the blogger is an endorser and that 
relationship needs to be disclosed.74 In addition, the 
advertiser could be held liable for unsubstantiated claims 
made by an endorser.75 
The FTC was very concerned with practices in which 
companies pay people to promote a product or service by 
praising it or using it as part of a seemingly noncommercial 
interaction in ordinary settings. A typical example:  
In Spring 2009, Royal Caribbean was criticized for posting 
positive reviews on travel review sites with a viral marketing 
team, the ‘Royal Champions,’ which was comprised of fans who 
posted positive comments on various sites such as Cruise 
  
 73. See, e.g., FTC Guides Concerning the Use of Endorsements and 
Testimonials in Advertising, 74 Fed. Reg. 53,124, 53,125 (Oct. 15, 2009) (codified 
at 16 C.F.R. pt. 255) [hereinafter FTC Endorsement Guides] (“The Guides have 
always defined ‘endorsements’ by focusing on the message consumers take from 
the speech at issue.”) (citation omitted); id. at 53,126 (“The Guides merely 
elucidate the Commission’s interpretation . . . but do not expand (or limit) its 
application to various forms of marketing.”). The FTC had already applied the 
principles of its earlier Guides Concerning Use of Endorsements and 
Testimonials in Advertising, which were issued in 1980, to online situations. 
See, e.g., In re TrendMark Inc., 126 F.T.C. 375 (1998), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/1998/06/9723255.pkg.htm (consent order arising from 
failure to adequately disclose in email and on website that endorsers of Neuro-
Thin and Lipo-Thin had a material connection with the sellers); Letter from 
Jodie Bernstein, Director, Bureau of Consumer Protection, to Kathryn C. 
Montgomery, President, and Jeffrey A. Chester, Executive Director of the 
Center for Media Education (July 15, 1997), available at 
http://ftc.gov/os/1997/07/cenmed.htm (responding to its petition requesting 
investigation of and enforcement action based on nondisclosure of sponsorships 
of the Web site KidsCom).  
    74. FTC Endorsement Guides, supra note 73, at 53,142-43 (§ 255.5 & 
Examples 7 & 8). 
    75. Id. at 53,139 (Example 5). 
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Critic. In return for positive postings, the Royal Champions 
were rewarded with free cruises and other perks.76  
Short-form social networking services like Twitter offer an 
especially promising opportunity for sponsored ads. As the 
New York Times reported,  
[i]t is perhaps the last frontier in advertising —getting regular 
people to send a sentence or two of text, on behalf of paying 
advertisers, to their friends and admirers. The idea . . . is that 
people trust recommendations from those they know and 
respect, while they increasingly ignore nearly ever[y] other 
kind of ad message in print, on television and online.77 
Large companies like Amazon are getting into the business, 
with the hopes of being able to target small, special interest 
groups through their friends as readily as advertisers 
already address the mass market.78 One marketer explained 
that “‘[a]ll we are trying to do is get consumers to become 
marketers for us.’”79 
Consumers trust commercial messages less than 
noncommercial ones, creating incentives for undisclosed 
promotion and resulting harms to consumers. Fake blogs 
and similar user-imitating content are unfortunately 
common, and are covered by the disclosure requirements.80 
  
 76. Gregory J. Hessinger et al., Advertising & Marketing, in NETWORK 
INTERFERENCE: A LEGAL GUIDE TO THE COMMERCIAL RISKS AND REWARDS OF THE 
SOCIAL MEDIA PHENOMENON 3, 6 (Douglas J. Wood et al. eds., 2009), 
http://www.reedsmith.com/_db/_documents/social_media_e-version.pdf. 
 77. Brad Stone, A Friend’s Tweet Could Be an Ad, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2009, 
at BU4.  
 78. See id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Candida Harty & Amy Mudge, FTC + Fake Blogs = Advertisers Might Get 
a Flogging, CONSUMER ADVER. LAW BLOG, Nov. 6, 2009, 
http://www.consumeradvertisinglawblog.com/2009/11/ftc-fake-blogs-advertisers-
might-get-a-flogging.html (“[M]any flogs [fake blogs] are carefully crafted to look 
exactly like a real blog complete with user comments and lively chat. The flogs 
will even include a few somewhat negative or skeptical comments regarding the 
product or service for sale to increase credibility. . . . Mary Engle, Director of the 
FTC’s Division of Advertising Practices says that the agency is targeting 
floggers, telling MSNBC that ‘[a]dvertising always has to be clear that it’s 
advertising’ and ‘[a]n ad disguised as a blog, or a blog where companies get 
people to pose as satisfied customers and write reviews, both are deceptive.’”); 
Bob Sullivan, “Fakeosphere” Latest Web Trap for Consumers, THE RED TAPE 
CHRONICLES, Nov. 4, 2009, http://redtape.msnbc.com/2009/11/latest-web-trap-
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The problem of deception may be even worse, however, 
when a source that is sometimes independent accepts 
compensation for positive reviews without disclosing the 
underlying business relationship. Unlike the explicitly 
advertiser-adopted content discussed in the previous 
section, hidden relationships may give advertisers excessive 
credibility by using apparently independent sources to 
confirm the advertiser’s message.81 The social science 
evidence is persuasive that source matters. Helen Norton 
summarizes: 
  
for-consumers-the-fakeosphere.html (“Internet marketing veteran and analyst 
Jay Weintraub says fake blogs—or flogs—fake news sites and manufactured 
testimonials are the fastest-growing segment of Internet advertising. He thinks 
it’s a $500 million-a-year industry— and he compares it to the explosive growth 
of spam a decade ago. ‘I don’t think people realize how big this has become, and 
how quickly,’ said Weintraub, adding that a popular top flog campaign can 
generate 10,000 daily sales.”). 
 81. See Goodman, supra note 55, at 705 (“Marketing theory predicts . . . that 
consumers will be more inclined to believe promotions when they are not clearly 
sourced by the brand owner. Marketing authorities instruct sponsors to keep a 
low profile in Web 2.0 promotions because speech that is or seems to be pure 
peer is more credible. If this is true, then peer promotions would seem to be 
highly credible and therefore potentially harmful if misrepresenting the facts. 
Even more so than traditional advertising, consumers would be at risk of 
‘uninformed acquiescence’ to the advertiser’s promotional scheme.”) (footnotes 
omitted). But see Memorandum from John P. Feldman, Reed Smith, LLP, at 3 
(Dec. 1, 2009), available at http://www.adlawbyrequest.com/uploads 
/file/Feldman%20Memorandum%20December%201%20on%20FTC%20Guides_d
oc.pdf (“The FTC has presented no evidence that consumers are being deceived 
by bloggers who review products and services on the Internet.”). On the general 
power of word of mouth marketing, see, e.g., Richard W. Easley, Virtual 
Communities . . . The Power of Word-of-Mouth Transmission Via the Internet, J. 
INTERNET MKTG., Mar. 2002, http://www.arraydev.com/commerce/jim/0203-
04.htm; Eric Goldman, Online Word of Mouth and Its Implications for 
Trademark Law, in TRADEMARK LAW AND THEORY 404, 409-10 (Graeme B. 
Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis, eds. 2008) (“For some industries . . . [consumer] 
word of mouth can make or break businesses. . . . Due to their sociability or 
expertise, some consumers (sometimes called ‘brand advocates’) are more 
influential than other consumers.”); Eric Goldman, Twitter, Email and Brand 
Engagement, TECH. & MKTG. LAW BLOG, June 17, 2009, 
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2009/06/twitter_email_a.htm (“Twitter has 
[a] really important benefit for brands. Folks are often willing to retweet a 
message—even a commercial message—thereby sharing it to their entire 
follower base in ways that these same folks would never forward a commercial 
email to hundreds of their friends. And this type of word-of-mouth marketing is 
the holy grail of marketing because of the extra imprimatur of having the 
message validated by someone in the reader’s social network.”). 
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[E]vidence from cognitive psychology and related fields reveals 
that individuals often use a message’s source as a mental 
shortcut, or heuristic, for evaluating its quality. Studies 
confirm that the more credible a speaker, the more likely her 
message will be effective, regardless of its content. Because 
speakers perceived as unpopular and/or unreliable will have 
more difficulty persuading listeners, they may be wise to seek 
the imprimatur of more trustworthy sources . . . . Moreover, 
the perception that a message is endorsed by such sources can 
help dispel onlookers’ suspicion of perspectives understood to 
be in the speaker’s own interest.82  
The appearance of voluntariness makes consumer 
speech more persuasive than the advertiser’s own obviously 
self-interested speech.83 Studies of Internet use in particular 
replicate this result. To take one significant example, 
consumers seek out and trust health information from other 
people (apparently) like them much more than they seek out 
and trust information from pharmaceutical companies.84 
  
 82. Helen Norton, The Measure of Government Speech: Identifying 
Expression’s Source, 88 B.U. L. REV. 587, 592-93 (2008) (footnotes omitted); see 
also Shelly Chaiken & Durairaj Maheswaran, Heuristic Processing Can Bias 
Systematic Processing: Effects of Source Credibility, Argument Ambiguity, and 
Task Importance on Attitude Judgment, 66 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 460, 
464 (1994) (finding that, under many circumstances, product evaluations 
supposedly from Consumer Reports were more persuasive than the identical 
evaluations supposedly from a retailer); Roobina Ohanian, The Impact of 
Celebrity Spokespersons’ Perceived Image on Consumers’ Intention to Purchase, 
31 J. ADVERTISING RES. 46, 47, 52 (1991) (noting that friends are perceived as 
more trustworthy than sales personnel because of the potential conflict of 
interest, and that the consumer “does not associate a high level of 
trustworthiness with individuals [such as celebrity endorsers] who get paid 
handsomely to promote a product”); Elaine Walster et al., On Increasing the 
Persuasiveness of a Low Prestige Communicator, 2 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 325, 327 (1966) available at http://www2.hawaii.edu/~elaineh/14.pdf 
(stating that perceived self-interest decreases the credibility of a source, while 
perceived altruism increases it, whether the source is generally low in 
credibility (a criminal) or high in credibility (a prosecutor)). 
 83. See Lillian R. BeVier, Competitor Suits for False Advertising Under 
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act: A Puzzle in the Law of Deception, 78 VA. L. 
REV. 1, 8 (arguing that consumers are wary of, and thus likely to discount, 
claims made by advertisers out of the advertisers’ self-interest). 
 84. Noah Elkin, How America Searches: Health and Wellness, ICROSSING 15, 
Jan. 2008, available at http://www.icrossing.com/articles/How%20America% 
20Searches%20%20Health%20and%20Wellness.pdf (showing substantial use of 
user-generated content and online social communities for health and wellness 
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Advertisers can also take advantage of the phenomenon 
of social proof: people have a powerful tendency to put faith 
in the wisdom of crowds, which viral marketing can 
simulate.85 Multiple sources endorsing the same product are 
more persuasive than a single source repeated multiple 
times.86 Using apparently different sources is especially 
useful for strengthening initially less-plausible claims. Even 
better from the marketer’s perspective, people don’t 
understand why they find the repeated, multiple-source 
claim plausible. They attribute it to the inherent truth 
value of the claim rather than to the repetition, making 
them particularly vulnerable to manipulation of this type.87 
With a wide swath of user-generated content, in the 
absence of disclosure a consumer can’t tell whether a 
reviewer was compensated for the review or was simply 
sharing her opinion because she believed everyone is 
entitled to it.88 As Mark Bartholomew’s piece in this volume 
  
information); id. at 16  (“Consumers rank pharmaceutical companies and 
television as the two least trusted sources for information about health-related 
issues and questions, and place them in the bottom tier in terms of sources that 
influence their medication choices.”). 
 85. ROBERT B. CIALDINI, INFLUENCE: SCIENCE AND PRACTICE 99-102 (5th ed. 
Pearson 2009) (1985); Norton, supra note 82, at 593 (“Some onlookers also rely 
on the public’s reaction to a message as a shortcut for evaluating its content, 
using widespread acceptance or audience enthusiasm to gauge a message’s 
quality.”). 
 86. Anne L. Roggeveen & Gita Venkataramani Johar, Perceived Source 
Variability Versus Familiarity: Testing Competing Explanations for the Truth 
Effect, 12 J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 81, 87 (2002) (“[B]elief in a claim is greater 
when it is perceived as coming from two different sources (vs. a single source).”); 
id. at 90 (“When claims are less plausible, feelings of familiarity engendered by 
repetition alone are not sufficient to enhance belief in the claim. However, 
exposure to the less plausible claim multiple times, each time from a different 
source, does enhance belief in repeated versus new claims.”). 
 87. Id. at 90 (“[T]he truth effect does occur for seemingly less plausible 
statements; however this occurs only under conditions where the multiple 
repetitions can be attributed to multiple sources. . . . [S]ubjects had no access to 
their use of number of sources in rating the truth value. Instead, subjects seized 
on the most likely explanation for their ratings—the plausibility of the claim. It 
appears that the use of source variability is an automatic process.”). 
 88. See FTC Endorsement Guides, supra note 73, at,53,136. Press Release, 
FTC, FTC Facts for Business, The FTC’s Revised Endorsement Guides: What 
People Are Asking 2 (June 2010), http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/ 
pubs/business/adv/bus71.pdf [hereinafter What People Are Asking] (justifying 
disclosure requirements for bloggers who act as endorsers). “[M]any bloggers 
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explains, people routinely use brands and brand claims to 
establish their own identities and social positioning, and are 
understood as doing so by their audiences. Even the most 
cynical observer doesn’t expect that everyone she sees has 
been paid to use, wear, praise, etc. the things they are 
using, wearing, praising, and so on. Given that companies 
exist to sell their products and services, the default 
expectation is that the money has flowed from consumer to 
seller by the consumer’s choice, and not the reverse. As a 
result, in the absence of disclosure, consumers will not 
assume that an apparently independent endorsement is in 
fact sponsored.  
The FTC’s announced intent is not to change traditional 
product reviews, but to ensure that marketing on social 
networks and (apparently) personal blogs is disclosed.89 
Some claim infringement on free speech, while others see 
FTC attention toward bloggers as a sign of their maturity 
and perhaps growing professionalism. If bloggers who are 
compensated for touting products tell their readers so, that 
may increase the level of trustworthiness both of their own 
posts and of posts where no disclosure is made, because 
  
who mention products don’t receive anything for their reviews and don’t get a 
commission if readers click on a link to buy a product”. Id. at 2. 
 89. See Amy E. Bivens, Endorsements Guides Not Meant to Address 
Traditional Reviews Online, FTC Official Says, 15 Electronic Com. & L. Rep. 
(BNA) 1516 (Oct. 21, 2009) (quoting Mary Engle, the FTC’s associate director for 
advertising practices: “‘We are concerned that if an advertiser pays or provides 
other incentives to an individual in exchange for writing about a product on 
MySpace or a personal blog, there is nothing there to suggest how an individual 
got a product or a mechanism for consumers to evaluate connections between 
reviewers and advertisers’”; “[t]hat concern is less prevalent among websites 
that resemble offline product reviews, [she] elaborated, because consumers 
understand the connection between traditional reviewers and brands.”); Fawn 
Johnson, FTC to Target Advertisers, Not Bloggers, in New Guidelines, NASDAQ, 
Oct. 14, 2009, http://www.nasdaq.com/aspx/stock-market-news-
story.aspx?storyid=200910141225dowjonesdjonline000606&title=ftc-to-target-
advertisersnot-bloggersin-new-guidelines (“‘We will be focusing any 
enforcements on advertisers, not on individual endorsers,’ Engle said . . . .  [T]he 
FTC’s focus has always been on ‘bad actor’ advertisers. ‘If a marketing company 
is paying people per blog or per tweet and not disclosing that in a large 
marketing scheme, then we can bring an investigation and that can lead to a 
lawsuit against the company,’ Engle said. Bloggers are expected to post whether 
they are paid for a positive post or if they received free products to review, ‘but 
the primary obligation is on the advertiser to tell the blogger to do it,’ Engle 
said.”). 
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readers will be more able to determine when an opinion is 
truly based on an independent assessment.90 Without 
regulation, a market for lemons will develop—a 
deterioration in the credibility of public discourse, because 
audiences won’t be able to trust that a stated opinion is 
independent and sincerely held.91 
B. Theoretical Concerns Relating to Disclosure and 
Substantiation 
 
 Debates over speech labeled “commercial” for purposes 
of First Amendment analysis often focus on the content of 
such speech, not its source, but source is also a puzzle. 
Underlying both the specific set of regulations at issue here 
and the divide in the constitutional status of commercial 
and noncommercial speech is the idea that there is 
something different about selling as the objective of speech. 
It naturally follows that we have to be prepared to decide 
what counts as selling. With respect to endorsements, the 
theory is that he who pays the piper calls the tune—even if 
the piper has license to improvise. This section explores in 
further detail the challenge that new forms of endorsement 
pose to commercial speech doctrine. 
1. Can Money Buy Noncommercial Speech? The new 
guidelines offer opportunities to consider what is different 
about commercial speech. People paid to speak well of a 
product might lack an autonomy interest in expressing this 
preference, as Robert Post has argued, thus falling within 
conventional definitions of commercial speakers.92 It is 
  
 90. See, e.g., Kayleen Schaefer, Fessing Up About Freebies, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
15, 2009, at E6. 
 91. George A. Akerlof, The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the 
Market Mechanism, in EXPLORATIONS IN PRAGMATIC ECONOMICS: SELECTED 
PAPERS OF GEORGE A. AKERLOF (AND CO-AUTHORS) 27, 33-34 (2005). 
 92. Post, Constitutional Status, supra note 20, at 12 (“[W]e most naturally 
understand persons who are advertising products for sale as seeking to advance 
their commercial interests rather than as participating in the public life of the 
nation. . . . [T]his is not ultimately a judgment about the motivations of 
particular persons, but instead about the social significance of a certain kind of 
speech.”). One might argue that newspapers, too, are careful not to anger 
advertisers. Still, the advertiser’s degree of influence over both topic choice and 
perspective, as well as consumer reactions, may justify disclosure-specific 
regulations. See infra Part III.B.2. 
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therefore important to ask whether the new guidelines truly 
cover commercial speech or noncommercial speech.  
The activities of the advertiser, if they are speech, 
appear to be commercial speech: designed to promote a 
product. Perhaps they are even less than that. Providing a 
free sample, or a hotel stay or other goodwill-inducing 
amenities, doesn’t seem like speech at all even if these acts 
have effects on the ultimate composition and balance of 
speech in the marketplace of ideas. After all, taxes and 
many other government policies affect the composition and 
balance of speech, but that doesn’t make every government 
act a speech regulation.93 One could argue that the FTC 
guidelines are different in that they are designed to affect 
the content of speech (that is, whether the speech contains a 
disclosure of affiliation and follows substantiation 
requirements), but that focuses analysis on the effects of the 
guideline on bloggers’ speech—considered next—and does 
not require the conclusion that the advertiser’s goodwill-
seeking behavior is itself speech. 
What about directly paying for a positive blog review? 
Money can be speech, or at least can be treated like speech, 
when it’s used to buy speech.94 In this context, the 
  
 93. But if money is speech, why isn’t a car (also worth money) speech? The 
problem, ultimately, is with the equation of money with speech, as has been 
noted many times before. 
 94. Even in the campaign finance reform context—involving heavily 
protected political speech—the Supreme Court has so far upheld restrictions on 
the amount of money donors can give directly to candidates and, crucially, it has 
also upheld disclosure requirements, on the theory that such requirements have 
important democratic discourse benefits without interfering with the free flow of 
the substance of the speech. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. 
Ct. 876, 914-16 (2010) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to disclosure 
requirements). “[T]he public has an interest in knowing who is speaking about a 
candidate shortly before an election,” making “the informational interest alone . 
. . sufficient to justify application” of disclosure requirements to ads promoting a 
political film. Id. at 915-16. See also McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 
U.S. 93, 96 (2003) (upholding requirement of disclosure of identities of anyone 
who contributed substantially to making electioneering ads); Buckley v. Valeo, 
424 U.S. 1, 60-84 (1976) (holding that although disclosure of contributor 
identities might deter some political contributions, the justifications were 
sufficient to satisfy “exacting scrutiny” under the First Amendment); cf. 
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 355 (1995) (“Disclosure of an 
expenditure and its use, without more, reveals far less information. It may be 
information that a person prefers to keep secret, and undoubtedly it often gives 
away something about the spender’s political views. Nonetheless, even though 
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advertiser’s money would be commercial speech, designed to 
promote a commercial transaction. Given that commercial 
speech doctrine favors disclosure and that substantiation is 
already required for ad claims, the new guidelines don’t 
seem problematic from the perspective of the advertiser. 
What, then, of the blogger’s speech? If the blogger were 
a copywriter, it would seem obvious that her speech was 
commercial even if the transaction it promoted wouldn’t 
provide any further benefit to her. She would be an agent of 
the advertiser for commercial speech purposes and could 
claim no greater speech rights than the advertiser itself, 
just as an ad-supported newspaper couldn’t assert greater 
rights to run ads than the advertiser could.95 At most, the 
blogger might be able to claim that the FTC could not 
enforce its regulation directly against her without satisfying 
the more exacting standards for requiring disclosures on 
noncommercial speech. But if the FTC can penalize an 
advertiser whose compensated promoters make 
unsubstantiated claims or fail to disclose the existence of 
compensation, then it can achieve much the same result, in 
terms of advertiser incentives and deterrence, as if it 
regulated bloggers directly. Indeed, the FTC has announced 
its intention to focus enforcement on advertisers 
themselves. And this result is not shocking: we already 
accept that noncommercial speakers like traditional 
newspapers can be held liable for the commercial speech 
they facilitate in certain circumstances, such as when a 
  
money may ‘talk,’ its speech is less specific, less personal, and less provocative 
than a handbill . . .”). Campaign finance laws do not necessarily require on-ad 
disclosure, but the greater burden of on-ad disclosure is balanced by the greater 
benefit to the audience. See Majors v. Abell, 361 F.3d 349, 353 (7th Cir. 2004) 
(“[T]he very thing that makes reporting less inhibiting than notice in the ad 
itself—fewer people are likely to see the report than the notice—makes 
reporting a less effective method of conveying information that by hypothesis 
the voting public values.”). 
 95. See, e.g., Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 256 (Cal. 2002) (“[C]ommercial 
speech generally or typically is directed to an audience of persons who may be 
influenced by that speech to engage in a commercial transaction with the 
speaker or the person on whose behalf the speaker is acting.”) (emphasis added); 
id. (“Economic motivation likewise implies that the speech is intended to lead to 
commercial transactions, which in turn assumes that the speaker and the target 
audience are persons who will engage in those transactions, or their agents or 
intermediaries.”) (emphasis added). 
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newspaper runs an ad for housing or employment that 
discriminates on the basis of race or sex.96  
Ellen Goodman argues that the paid blogger is engaging 
in “mixed” speech, making determination of whether her 
speech is commercial a difficult proposition.97 By contrast, I 
would argue that a significant economic benefit—whether 
past or expected—conferred by the subject of the speech is 
enough to make the blogger’s speech commercial for 
purposes of First Amendment analysis, at least when the 
issue is whether the economic relationship between the 
blogger and the advertiser should be disclosed.98 That is, not 
all portions of a particular post might be commercial speech, 
and not all regulations on that post might be 
constitutional;99 but a disclosure requirement focused on the 
  
 96. Congress made it unlawful to “make, print, or publish, or cause to be 
made, printed, or published” discriminatory ads for housing. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) 
(2006). Specifically, Congress did not exempt ads run by individuals who were 
exempt from the underlying antidiscrimination requirement; such individuals 
are required to find ways to discriminate without the assistance of publishers, 
42 U.S.C. § 3603(b) (2006); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on 
Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 386-89 (1973); Nicholas Pedriana & Amanda 
Abraham, Now You See Them, Now You Don’t: The Legal Field and Newspaper 
Desegregation of Sex-Segregated Help Wanted Ads 1965-75, 31 LAW & SOC. 
INQUIRY 905, 911-17 (2006). See generally Nicholas Pedriana, Help Wanted 
NOW: Legal Resources, the Women’s Movement, and the Battle over Sex-
Segregated Job Advertisements, 51 SOC. PROBS. 182 (2004) (detailing the events 
leading up to the Pittsburgh Press decision). 
 97. Goodman, supra note 55, at 699.  
 98. Cf. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 531 (1945) (“[I]t does not resolve 
where the line shall be drawn in a particular case merely to urge . . . that an 
organization for which the rights of free speech and free assembly are claimed is 
one ‘engaged in business activities’ or that the individual who leads it in 
exercising these rights receives compensation for doing so. . . . These 
comparisons are at once too simple, too general, and too inaccurate to be 
determinative. Where the line shall be placed in a particular application rests, 
not on such generalities, but on the concrete clash of particular interests . . . .”). 
 99. The fact that some elements of a post constituted noncommercial 
speech—discussing, for example, a blogger’s political beliefs-would not prevent 
regulation of the commercial elements. When commercial and noncommercial 
elements are “inextricably intertwined,” treating the speech as noncommercial 
is appropriate, but the Supreme Court has limited this principle to cases in 
which there is practical or legal compulsion to combine the two types. Bd. of Trs. 
of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 474 (1989) (“No law of man or of 
nature makes it impossible to sell housewares without teaching home 
economics, or to teach home economics without selling housewares.”). 
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potential for deception and distortion of consumer decisions 
based on the economic relationship between the underlying 
advertiser and the speaker is consistent with the 
justification for commercial speech doctrine.100 As Justice 
Stevens wrote in advocating a functional definition of 
acceptable commercial speech regulations: “When a State 
regulates commercial messages to protect consumers from 
misleading, deceptive, or aggressive sales practices, or 
requires the disclosure of beneficial consumer information, 
the purpose of its regulation is consistent with the reasons 
for according constitutional protection to commercial speech 
and therefore justifies less than strict review.”101  
Focusing on commercial harms and the preservation of 
a fair bargaining process can help explain why undisclosed 
sponsorship or unsubstantiated claims made by a party 
compensated for making those claims can be regulated.102 I   
 100. The FTC’s requirement that sponsored speech follow the same 
substantiation requirements that conventional advertising does is more 
interesting than the disclosure requirement, but follows from the same agency 
principles. See discussion infra Part III.C. If substantiation can be required at 
all, it can be required of statements made by an advertiser’s agents. See Porter 
& Dietsch, Inc. v. FTC, 605 F.2d 294, 309 (7th Cir. 1979) (“The [Federal Trade 
Commission Act] does not make mental state an element of violation and 
creates no exemption from liability for parties not involved in the creation of the 
false advertising or for unwitting disseminators of false advertising.”); id. 
(“‘[T]hat an advertiser made its representations in good or bad faith is not 
determinative of whether such statements are deceptive and misleading.’”) 
(quoting Doherty, Clifford, Steers & Shenfield, Inc. v. FTC, 392 F.2d 921, 925 
(6th Cir. 1968)); cf. Delcianna J. Winders, Note, Combining Reflexive Law and 
False Advertising Law to Standardize “Cruelty-Free” Labeling of Cosmetics, 81 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 454, 469-70 (2006) (“[A] manufacturer that has verified that its 
‘cruelty-free’ claims are accurate might bring suit [under the Lanham Act] 
against a company that claims its products are ‘cruelty-free’ while continuing to 
hire subcontractors to perform animal-based ingredient testing.”). See generally 
Rebecca Tushnet, It Depends on What the Meaning of “False” Is: Falsity and 
Misleadingness in Commercial Speech Doctrine, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 227 (2007) 
(explaining why a system that regulates false and misleading commercial 
speech without First Amendment scrutiny and with no heightened scienter 
requirement for fraud is desirable). 
 101. 44 Liquormart, Inc., v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 501 (1996) (per 
curiam) (Stevens, J.). 
 102. Id. at 502 (Stevens, J.) (“It is the State’s interest in protecting consumers 
from ‘commercial harms’ that provides ‘the typical reason why commercial 
speech can be subject to greater governmental regulation than noncommercial 
speech.’” (quoting City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 
426 (1993)). 
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will take up the question of the blogger as the advertiser’s 
representative, and the extent to which the common law of 
agency isn’t the limit of appropriate regulation, further in 
the discussion of section 230 of the CDA in Section III.C 
below. 
2. Speaker-Based Discrimination? A related issue is 
whether the regulation, though potentially acceptable, is 
unconstitutionally underinclusive because it does not 
require the same disclosures for mass media reviewers who 
also receive freebies or whose employers are paid for the 
endorsements.103 The argument would be based on a 
principle embraced by the Supreme Court in R.A.V. v. City 
of St. Paul: even when an entire class of speech, such as 
fighting words, may constitutionally be regulated, 
constitutional infirmity may arise if the regulator chooses a 
subclass on the wrong basis.104 The harm in R.A.V. was, the 
Court believed, viewpoint discrimination, because the law in 
that case barred racially discriminatory fighting words and 
not racially egalitarian fighting words, thus treating 
speakers with different viewpoints differently.105  
  
 103. Pay-for-placement deals are growing in traditional media for many of the 
same reasons that advertising is creeping into user-generated content. See 
Goodman, supra note 11, at 142 (arguing that the increasing difficulty of 
capturing audience attention in a media-fragmented world make payola, 
product placement, and other advertiser-friendly but secretive practices more 
attractive as ways for advertisers to get attention and media producers to fund 
their productions while traditional ad revenues fall). Goodman argues that 
disclosure policies should be technology-neutral, though she does not suggest 
that variation is constitutionally infirm. See id. at 145, 151.  
  Perhaps there should be a general disclosure requirement when, for 
example, an advertiser funds a novel. Given the constitutionality of disclosure 
requirements in political ads, there would seem to be no constitutional barrier, 
assuming that the government articulated a sufficient justification for novelistic 
disclosures. Product placement does exist in novels. See David D. Kirkpatrick, 
Now, Many Words From Our Sponsor, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 2001, at A1 
(describing “marquee” author Fay Weldon’s acceptance of an undisclosed sum of 
money to feature Italian jewelry company Bulgari in her 2001 novel THE 
BULGARI CONNECTION). Kirkpatrick explains that while this advertising 
arrangement was believed to be the first for the book industry, “the current crop 
of ‘chick lit’ novels and memoirs about the lives of young women offers potential 
for touting vodka, cigarettes, clothing and other brands, [Weldon’s agent] said. 
‘The sky is the limit.’”. Id. 
  104. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 381-84 (1991). 
  105. Id. at 391-92. 
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There does not seem to be viewpoint discrimination in 
the new FTC guides, but there is (arguably) speaker 
discrimination between old and new media, which often 
seems much like content discrimination and thus might 
seem to require some sort of credible justification.106 An 
unsympathetic view of the new rule is that it treats non-
traditional sources as less trustworthy than old media, even 
though consumers deceived by undisclosed connections 
between bloggers and advertisers may also be deceived 
about the ways in which undisclosed complimentary 
products and related perks influence newspaper and 
magazine writers.  
The FTC, however, maintains that there is no difference 
at all in treatment.  In response to the question, “Do the 
Guides hold online reviewers to a higher standard than 
reviewers for paper-and-ink publications?” the FTC states: 
No. The Guides apply across the board. The issue is—and 
always has been—whether the audience understands the 
reviewer’s relationship to the company whose products are being 
reviewed. If the audience gets the relationship, a disclosure isn’t 
needed. For a review in a newspaper, on TV, or on a website 
with similar content, it’s usually clear to the audience that the 
reviewer didn’t buy the product being reviewed. It’s the 
reviewer’s job to write his or her opinion and no one thinks they 
bought the product—for example, a book or movie ticket—
themselves. But on a personal blog, a social networking page, or 
in similar media, the reader may not expect the reviewer to have 
a relationship with the company whose products are mentioned. 
Disclosure of that relationship helps readers decide how much 
weight to give the review.107  
  
 106. But see Marvin Ammori, Another Worthy Tradition: How the Free Speech 
Curriculum Ignores Electronic Media and Distorts Free Speech Doctrine, 70 MO. 
L. REV. 59 (2005) (surveying the ways in which broadcast media have 
traditionally been treated differently than print media, as a perfectly acceptable 
speaker-based distinction at the core of modern First Amendment law). 
  107. What People Are Asking, supra note 88, at 3; see also FTC Endorsement 
Guides, supra note 73, at 53,136 (“The Commission acknowledges that bloggers 
may be subject to different disclosure requirements than reviewers in 
traditional media. In general, under usual circumstances, the Commission does 
not consider reviews published in traditional media (i.e., where a newspaper, 
magazine, or television or radio station with independent editorial responsibility 
assigns an employee to review various products or services as part of his or her 
official duties, and then publishes those reviews) to be sponsored advertising 
messages. Accordingly, such reviews are not ‘endorsements’ within the meaning 
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Moreover, there is not a significant problem of newspapers 
and other traditional media getting paid to place favorable 
reviews without disclosure,108 and there are in fact already 
some disclosure laws governing broadcast media.109 
  
of the Guides. Under these circumstances, the Commission believes, knowing 
whether the media entity that published the review paid for the item in 
question would not affect the weight consumers give to the reviewer’s 
statements.”) (footnotes omitted). 
 108. As Ellen Goodman points out, newspapers (and magazines) generally 
adhere to a convention of putting “advertisement” prominently on ads otherwise 
formatted to look like editorial content, in order to decrease the risks of 
deception. They do this to comply with a journalistic norm and with an 
admittedly underenforced law.  Goodman, supra note 11, at 151. But see Josef 
Adalian, NBC’s ‘Southland’ Pushes Ad Limits in L.A. Times, TELEVISION WEEK, 
Apr. 9, 2009, http://www.tvweek.com/news/ 2009/04/nbcs_southland_pushes_ad 
_limit.php; Bob Steele, L.A. Times Pitched NBC on ‘Southland’ Front Page Ad 
Concept, POYNTERONLINE: EVERYDAY ETHICS, Apr. 10, 2009, 
http://www.poynter.org/column.asp?id=67&aid=161630. In tough economic 
times, the temptation to violate traditional newspaper norms may prove too 
great to resist. If newspaper publishers develop a problem with undisclosed 
advertiser-sponsored content, then they, too, should be prepared for the FTC’s 
interest. 
 109. See Endorsement Guides, supra note 73, at 53,136 (noting that the FTC 
would take a different view of traditional media reviews if the reviewer received 
benefits directly from the manufacturer or its agent); Goodman, supra note 11, 
at 84 (federal law bars secret payments to radio stations to play music, and 
undisclosed payments to broadcasters to feature products or story lines). The 
Communications Act requires broadcasters to disclose sponsors who provide any 
type of valuable consideration, though free products or services are exempt if 
they have minimal value. See 47 U.S.C. § 317 (2006) (requiring broadcasters to 
disclose to their listeners or viewers if matter has been aired in exchange for 
money, services or other valuable consideration, though, subject to certain 
exceptions, no disclosure is necessary for “any service or property furnished 
without charge or at nominal charge for use on, or in connection with, a 
broadcast . . .”); 47 C.F.R. § 73.1212 (2008) (detailing broadcasters’ 
responsibilities); see also 47 U.S.C. § 508 (payola disclosure provision requiring 
that, when anyone provides or promises to provide money, services or other 
consideration to someone to include program matter in a broadcast, that fact 
must be disclosed in advance of the broadcast); Sponsorship Identification Rules 
and Embedded Advertising, 23 F.C.C.R. 10682 (2008) (notice of inquiry and 
proposed rulemaking). The FCC has occasionally enforced its rules against 
failure to disclose the source of paid programming such as Department of 
Education-funded promotion of No Child Left Behind and company-generated 
video news releases that look like standard news reporting. See, e.g., Comcast 
Corp., 07 D.A. 4005 (2007) (notice of apparent liability), available at 
http://www.fcc.gov/eb/Orders/ 2007/DA-07-4005A1.html; Sonshine Family 
Television, Inc., 07 F.C.C. 152 (2007) (notice of apparent liability), available at 
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  This justification discounts the potentially distorting 
role of special access—the way that getting free movie 
tickets to a preview or other forms of special treatment 
might distort reporters’ reactions by generating goodwill in 
pretty much the same way that gifts directly to bloggers or 
reporters can. But that is just a more specific version of the 
general criticism that speech is influenced by all sorts of 
factors, such that commercial speech is no different than 
noncommercial speech. As long as the divide in 
constitutional status between the two types persists, it 
should be reasonable for the FTC to determine that direct 
gifts require disclosure.  
The undisclosed sponsorship problem in new media is 
also more of a concern because of bloggers’ greater 
heterogeneity. In the absence of a disclosure requirement, a 
consumer can’t reasonably distinguish the bloggers who are 
promoting products and services because they like them 
from the ones who are doing so because they are being 
paid.110 Readers cannot tell which reviewers offering 
  
http://www.fcc.gov/eb/Orders/2007/FCC-07-152A1.html; Letter of Citation to the 
Graham Williams Group, 07 D.A. 3351 (2007), available at 
http://www.fcc.gov/eb/Orders/2007/DA-07-3351A1.html. 
 110. See FTC Endorsement Guides, supra note 73, at 53,135 (“[A] consumer-
generated endorsement [on a blog] appears in a medium that does not make 
[the] association with the advertiser apparent to consumers.”); id. at 53,134 
(“[O]ne factor in determining whether the connection between an advertiser and 
its endorsers should be disclosed is the type of vehicle being used to disseminate 
that endorsement—specifically, whether or not the nature of that medium is 
such that consumers are likely to recognize the statement as an advertisement 
(that is, as sponsored speech). Thus, although disclosure of compensation may 
not be required when a celebrity or expert appears in a conventional television 
advertisement, endorsements by these individuals in other media might 
warrant such disclosure.”); What People Are Asking, supra note 88, at 2 (“[T]he 
financial arrangements between some bloggers and advertisers may be apparent 
to industry insiders, but not to everyone else who reads a blog.… [E]ven if some 
readers are aware of these deals, many readers aren’t.”). Others agree with the 
FTC that consumers are not yet certain how to interpret social media and other 
Internet sources, and thus are vulnerable to deception from undisclosed 
connections. See Sullivan, supra note 81 (“Surprisingly, inserting an extra step 
into the process—fake testimonials and blogs—dramatically improves 
[responses to ads], [an Internet marketer] said. ‘Fifteen years people have been 
trying to market online, this proved to be key,’ he said. ‘The biggest difference is 
that somebody realized that blogging as a medium had seeped into 
consciousness and become like TV news, had become a trusted source. The 
average person doesn’t realize blogging can be easily manipulated.’”). 
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opinions on an auto-focused website have been 
compensated. They can more readily evaluate the more 
familiar role of the newspaper car columnist. One might 
argue that the risk of deception is lower with unfamiliar or 
new media, but the social science evidence suggests the 
contrary. People don’t use old coping strategies as well 
against new forms of persuasion.111 Moreover, even as the 
Internet ages, the problem of heterogeneity—the inability to 
figure out which ten out of every hundred reviewers are 
paid shills—will continue to be a problem not present in 
more traditional media, which cannot and do not present 
one hundred reviews of the same thing. 
Even R.A.V. recognized that a regulator can 
legitimately target a subset of regulable speech, as long as 
that subset is of greater concern because of the reason the 
overall category is regulable in the first place.112 So, if 
potential deception over sponsorship is a worse problem 
with user-generated content than with traditional 
commercial media, then the inequality argument loses force 
(though improved disclosure requirements for traditional 
media might also be justified). This conclusion may be 
particularly persuasive with respect to a disclosure 
requirement, given that it does not outright ban any speech 
and is not a significant burden on a speaker. 
3. The Benefits and Burdens of Disclosure. Disclosure is, 
in fact, a constitutionally favored method of commercial 
speech regulation because it supposedly improves the 
quality of speech without necessarily interfering with the 
  
 111. DAVID M. BOUSH, DECEPTION IN THE MARKETPLACE: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF 
DECEPTIVE PERSUASION AND CONSUMER SELF-PROTECTION 16-17, 189 (2009) 
(deception protection strategies are context-specific and do not transfer well 
across situations, especially in new media). 
 112. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992) (“When the basis for 
the content discrimination consists entirely of the very reason the entire class of 
speech at issue is proscribable, no significant danger of idea or viewpoint 
discrimination exists. Such a reason, having been adjudged neutral enough to 
support exclusion of the entire class of speech from First Amendment protection, 
is also neutral enough to form the basis of distinction within the class. To 
illustrate: A State might choose to prohibit only that obscenity which is the most 
patently offensive in its prurience—i.e., that which involves the most lascivious 
displays of sexual activity.”). 
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speaker’s own legitimate interests in conveying truthful 
information.113 As Seth Kreimer explains,  
[some First Amendment] cases suggest that the same words 
from different sources should be accorded different weights, and 
perhaps different meanings. The ability to conceal this 
information from the public, in this view, is a means of 
manipulation by which speakers gain their objects without 
public consent. This emphasis on origin accords with our 
everyday experience as lawyers and citizens. Witnesses are 
impeached or accredited by showing their background, and the 
weight of opposing counsel’s assurances may depend on 
counsel’s character. Our reaction to a request to sign a petition 
  
 113. In Va. Bd. of Pharmacy,v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, the Court held 
that commercial speech could be required to “include such additional 
information, warnings, and disclaimers, as are necessary to prevent its being 
deceptive.” 425 U.S. 748, 771 n.24 (1976). See also Zauderer v. Office of 
Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 650-51 (1985) (“In requiring attorneys who 
advertise their willingness to represent clients on a contingent-fee basis to state 
that the client may have to bear certain expenses even if he loses, Ohio has not 
attempted to prevent attorneys from conveying information to the public; it has 
only required them to provide somewhat more information than they might 
otherwise be inclined to present. . . . [A]n advertiser’s rights are adequately 
protected as long as disclosure requirements are reasonable related to the 
State’s interest in preventing deception of consumers.”); cf. Doe v. Reed, 130 
S.Ct. 2811 (2010) (upholding facial constitutionality of identity disclosure 
requirement in the context of political petitions in order to avoid fraud and 
foster government transparency and accountability);  Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 
465, 480-81 (1987) (upholding a law requiring disclosure of foreign origin for 
films attempting to alter American foreign policy because it was a valid method 
of enabling the public to better evaluate the film; in reality, to enjoin the 
mandatory disclosure of the film’s origin actually “with[held] information from 
the public”); First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 792 n.32 (1978) (holding 
that at least for “highly visible” political advertising, the government has a 
compelling interest in notifying voters of an advertisement’s source); Viereck v. 
United States, 318 U.S. 236, 251 (1943) (“[T]he fundamental constitutional 
principle [is] that our people, adequately informed, may be trusted to 
distinguish between the true and the false . . . [and disclosure laws insure] that 
hearers and readers may not be deceived by the belief that the information 
comes from a disinterested source.”); id. (holding that a federal source disclosure 
law for agents of foreign countries “implements rather than detracts from the 
prized freedoms guaranteed by the First Amendment”); Majors v. Abell, 361 
F.3d 349, 352 (7th Cir. 2004) (presuming that disclosure of the entities behind 
political ads will improve the information environment for citizens by providing 
useful information). 
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might well differ depending on whether it was circulated by 
Ralph Nader, Jerry Falwell, or Lyndon Larouche . . . .114 
Depending on the circumstances, knowing the name of a 
speaker may not be enough. Audiences consider it relevant 
that an advertiser paid for a review,115 and not just in the 
U.S.; the European Commission recently took the position 
that undisclosed sponsorship is unfair to consumers even if 
the factual message conveyed is true.116 We generally 
believe that having a material interest in some outcome 
affects one’s position in advocating for that outcome. 
Sponsorship disclosure, therefore, is a way of protecting 
  
 114. Seth F. Kreimer, Sunlight, Secrets, and Scarlet Letters: The Tension 
Between Privacy and Disclosure in Constitutional Law, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 82 
(1991). In large part because of the risks of retaliation against members of 
unpopular political groups, Kreimer does not endorse this principle as sufficient 
to justify all disclosures in the case of political speech. Kreimer does not address 
commercial speech. 
 115. Cf. Malcolm A. Heinicke, A Political Reformer’s Guide to Mcintyre and 
Source Disclosure Laws for Political Advertising, 8 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 133, 
139 (1997) (“The 1994 battle over Proposition 188 in California provides a good 
example of the need for source disclosure laws. Proposition 188 involved the 
tobacco industry’s attempt to invalidate some of California’s anti-tobacco laws. 
Knowing that it would have difficulty convincing the public to support its self-
serving initiative, the industry disingenuously billed its measure as a tobacco 
control effort. Once voters realized that the tobacco industry had sponsored the 
initiative and its advertisements, however, the measure was doomed. Indeed, 
California voters overwhelmingly defeated the measure. Had the tobacco 
industry been able to remain anonymous (as it largely was during the signature 
drive which successfully put the measure on the ballot), the measure would 
likely have fared better. . . . [I]n discussing this article with a constitutional law 
professor, I asked her how she had voted on Proposition 188. She answered that 
she had voted against the tobacco industry after someone explained the measure 
to her. In other words, even for world-class legal scholars, the source of a 
campaign ad is a necessary tool for evaluation. Furthermore, not all voters have 
access to cogent explanations, and thus, may rely even more on the identity of 
the proponents and opponents of ballot measures for guidance.”) (footnotes 
omitted). 
 116. See EUROPEAN COMM’N, GUIDANCE ON THE IMPLEMENTATION/APPLICATION 
OF DIRECTIVE 2005/29/EC ON UNFAIR COMMERCIAL PRACTICES 8, 31 (2009), 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/rights/docs/Guidance_UCP_Directive_en.pdf  
(explaining that commercial practices are misleading if they are untruthful in 
any way or if, in their “overall presentation, [they] deceive[ ] or [are] likely to 
deceive[ ] the average consumer, even if the information is factually correct”; 
marketing would be “unfair” if, for example, cosmetic companies paid bloggers 
to promote and advertise their products on a blog, unbeknownst to other users). 
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listeners’ autonomy against manipulation.117 As Eric 
Goldman notes, consumers “routinely say that they want to 
know when content is marketing.”118 
This problem has been recognized in other areas of the 
law, for example in the copyright case of Ty v. PIL, where 
Ty required its licensees who produced collector’s guides to 
its Beanie Babies to disclaim affiliation. Judge Posner 
commented that this practice was misleading. Ty’s licensees 
offered opinions about the value of Beanie Babies that were 
more credible because they appeared—but were not in 
fact—independent, thus allowing Ty to reap greater profits. 
The law intervened by allowing others to produce 
unauthorized guides, denying Ty control over the market it 
had been distorting.119 
  
 117. See Kreimer, supra note 114, at 87 (“If anonymity can be invoked at will 
by the speaker . . . the speaker may use anonymity strategically to induce the 
listener to act in accord with the speaker’s will.  Selective silence can 
manipulate preferences as effectively as speech . . . .”). Kreimer finds this 
insufficient to justify certain disclosures in the political arena, because the 
messages that benefit from anonymity or nondisclosure are those from 
culturally disfavored sources—politically unpopular groups like Communists—
making forced disclosure a tool that is easily misused for political ends. See id. 
at 88. “The Surgeon General is unlikely to claim the benefits of anonymity, 
although the CIA may do so. Popular speakers need no shelter.” Id. With respect 
to “astroturfed” speech by marketers, this dynamic is not present. Though 
consumers may be skeptical of ad claims, there is no reason to think that they 
are biased against Coca-Cola or General Motors generally, or that these entities 
are at risk of either governmental or popular oppression; they run plenty of ads, 
but also want “user-generated” endorsements that seem independent. Cf. R. 
George Wright, Free Speech and the Mandated Disclosure of Information, 25 U. 
RICH. L. REV. 475, 491-92 (1991) (arguing that discriminatory effect is an 
important consideration in evaluating claims that disclosure requirements are 
illegitimate). Kreimer also argues that marketing is not as efficacious as we 
once thought it was, so disclosure isn’t as necessary—our “media-saturated 
electorate” won’t be “duped into self-destruction by nefarious forces hiding 
behind ‘institutes’ or ‘coalitions.’” Kreimer, supra note 114, at 88.  Again, his 
concerns may be convincing with respect to political speech by misleadingly-
named institutes and coalitions, but the rise of social media has created a new 
opportunity for exploitation of consumers’ belief in the credibility of other 
consumers’ individual experiences. 
 118. Goldman, Coasean Marketing, supra note 5, at 1189. 
 119. Ty, Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l Ltd., 292 F.3d 512, 520 (7th Cir. 2002) (“Ty doesn’t 
like criticism, and so the copyright licenses that it grants to those publishers 
whom it is willing to allow to publish Beanie Baby collectors’ guides reserve to it 
the right to veto any text in the publishers’ guides. It also forbids its licensees to 
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Just as disclosure has benefits, nondisclosure has costs. 
Without some indication of the terms on which a “user” is 
participating in a debate—as a fan, as a shill, or as some 
combination—audiences may lose trust in the medium, 
moving user reviews and blog posts from credible grassroots 
judgments to unbelievable “astroturf.”120 
Eric Goldman contests the policy basis for disclosure 
requirements.121 One obvious risk is that overly complex 
disclosure might contribute to information overload.122 
However, it is not clear that “disclosure: I received a free 
Playstation in return for this post” is too hard for consumers 
  
reveal that they are licensees of Ty. Its standard licensing agreement requires 
the licensee to print on the title page and back cover of its publication the 
following misleading statement: ‘This publication is not sponsored or endorsed 
by, or otherwise affiliated with Ty Inc. All Copyrights and Trademarks of Ty 
Inc. are used by permission. All rights reserved.’”) (citations omitted). 
  120. See Akerlof, supra note 91; Schaefer, supra note 90, at E6; see also Ann 
Bartow, Some Peer-to-Peer, Democratically, and Voluntarily-Produced Thoughts, 
5 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 449, 458 (2007) (reviewing YOCHAI BENKLER, 
THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND 
FREEDOM (2006)) (“Astroturf subverts an informal norm of the Internet and of 
the blogosphere in particular, authenticity.”); Goodman, supra note 11, at 86-87 
(arguing that stealth marketing causes epistemic harms to the quality of public 
discourse and the integrity of public institutions, and that sponsorship 
disclosure thus corrects market failures). Without disclosure requirements, 
“[d]oubt that an editor has an authentic voice leads to an overgeneralization of 
distrust as audiences come to believe that mediated speech is inauthentic or 
untrue even when it is not.” Id.; Posting of John D. to Making Light, 
http://nielsenhayden.com/makinglight/archives/ 007947.html#141279 (Sept. 2, 
2006, 9:09) (“The killing aspect of astroturf is that it poisons the well of 
discourse. Before this, you could at least have a degree of confidence that the 
stupid was authentic stupid. I’m not sure if I can deal with sorting out the fake 
stupid.”) (quoted in Bartow, supra, at 460)). 
 121. Eric Goldman, Stealth Risks of Regulating Stealth Marketing, 85 TEX. L. 
REV. SEE ALSO 11, 13-14 (2006), available at http://www.texaslrev.com/ 
seealso/vol/85/responses/goldman (expressing skepticism that consumers will 
evaluate disclosures in the ways policymakers hope); see also Omri Ben-Shahar,  
Myths of Consumer Protection: Information, Litigation, and Access, Address for 
the Ronald H. Coase Lecture in Law and Economics (Feb. 17, 2009) (video 
available at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/node/426) c. 17:55 (criticizing 
disclosure requirements in general as unlikely to be understood or properly 
evaluated).   
  122.  Goldman, supra note 121, at 14. Disclosure requirements can arguably be 
hard to implement, especially in a rapid-fire medium. See id. at 13-14. 
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to process.123 Even the extremely short-form messages on 
Twitter are getting by with “Ad:” or “Sponsored:” at the 
beginning.124 
Goldman further notes that consumers have trouble 
distinguishing sponsored from organic search engine 
results. Moreover, users sometimes seem to trust sponsored 
search results more than organic results: “consumers 
regularly rate the utility of paid Internet search results 
(such as ‘sponsored links’) as equal to or better than unpaid 
search results generated by the search engine’s algorithms. 
In one survey, 75% of consumers felt this way.”125 At the 
same time, the label “marketing” is a turnoff, leading 
consumers to disregard content even when it might be 
relevant to them had they encountered it without the label. 
That is, consumers like paid results, but apparently they 
like them more when they do not know or are not thinking 
about the fact that they are paid. Thus, Goldman concludes, 
disclosure may paradoxically end up with consumers getting 
less of the information they want.126 Worse, the disclosure 
  
  123. Eric Goldman pointed out that each additional requirement adds 
something for consumers to process, and given how little we know about what 
goes on in consumers’ highly variable brains, there might well be people who are 
distracted by this disclosure from other information they would prefer to have. 
Goldman, supra note 121, at 14. This is certainly a possibility, but I believe it 
comes down to a judgment about what people, reasoning before the fact, would 
want to know about promotional messages. Not all matters of relevance can be 
disclosed in every message, and no one is seriously proposing that such a regime 
be tried. But the sponsorship of a message is relevant across a large number of 
situations. 
  124.  The FTC takes the position that if a particular format makes disclosure 
impossible, the advertiser must avoid that format to prevent deception. There 
are things one can and can’t articulate in 140 characters. If the message is so 
incomplete that it becomes misleading when it’s that compressed, then Twitter 
isn’t an appropriate ad medium for that message. Caroline McCarthy, Yes, New 
FTC Guidelines Extend to Facebook Fan Pages, CNET NEWS, Oct. 5, 2009, 
http://news.cnet.com/8301-13577_3-10368064-36.html?tag=mncol;mlt_related 
(“‘There are ways to abbreviate a disclosure that fit within 140 characters,’ [the 
associate director of the FTC’s advertising division] said. ‘You may have to say a 
little bit of something else, but if you can’t make the disclosure, you can’t make 
the ad.’”). As long as it is constitutional to ban misleading commercial speech, 
the FTC’s conclusion seems unobjectionable. 
 125. Goldman, supra note 121, at 12 (footnotes omitted).   
 126. See id. at 13 (“The ‘advertising’ label is a powerful disclosure; it can 
single-handedly cause consumers to overlook content they would have otherwise 
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requirements may convince consumers that the relationship 
between the advertiser and the speaker matters, when they 
might not otherwise care.127  
Judges have expressed this overdeterrence concern in 
other circumstances, suggesting that disclosure interferes 
with an audience’s ability to evaluate a claim on its own 
merits.128 The legal argument, however, is generally tied to 
anonymity rather than failure to disclose a connection. The 
reasoning continues that readers are able to factor in 
anonymity (or pseudonymity) as part of their overall 
evaluation of the message’s credibility. But by definition, 
readers can’t factor in an undisclosed connection. At most, 
they can discount all claims because of the possibility of an 
undisclosed connection with the advertiser, which brings us 
back to the classic problem of the market for lemons: 
information generally becomes unreliable, as consumers 
discount independent information too much and sponsored 
  
found meritorious. A 2005 study . . . illustrates this risk. Consumers were shown 
multiple sets of Internet search results, some of which were labeled advertising. 
Although the search results substantively were the same, consumers rated the 
unlabeled search results as more relevant than the labeled results. In other 
words, the advertising label single-handedly degraded the consumers’ relevancy 
assessment even though the search results had the same level of relevancy.”) 
(footnotes omitted); see also Feldman, supra note 81, at 3 (“[T]he FTC has 
infused confusion into the marketplace and will undoubtedly encourage 
disclosure of ‘material terms’ that are probably more likely to confuse consumers 
than help them.”).   
 127. See Goldman, supra note 121, at 14-15 (“By mandating sponsorship 
disclosures, the government communicates to consumers that they should care 
about the distinctions between editorial and marketing content. . . . When the 
government makes disclosures louder, it may simply be ratcheting up the 
communicative import of the message, heightening consumer sensitivity to the 
sponsorship disclosure and magnifying the risk of erroneous consumer reactions 
to the disclosure.”).   
 128. See Majors v. Abell, 361 F.3d 349, 357 (7th Cir. 2004) (Easterbrook, J., 
concurring dubitante) (“[W]e must consider the possibility that anonymity 
promotes a focus on the strength of the argument rather than the identity of the 
speaker; this is a reason why Madison, Hamilton, and Jay chose to publish The 
Federalist anonymously. Instead of having to persuade New Yorkers that his 
roots in Virginia should be overlooked, Madison could present the arguments 
and let the reader evaluate them on merit.”); ACLU of Nev. v. Heller, 378 F.3d 
979, 994 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[F]ar from enhancing the reader’s evaluation of a 
message, identifying the publisher can interfere with that evaluation by 
requiring the introduction of potentially extraneous information at the very 
time the reader encounters the substance of the message.”).   
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information too little. Ultimately, anonymity and 
pseudonymity are distinguishable from the 
misrepresentation that accompanies puppetry.129  
In light of consumers’ discounting for uncertainty, the 
studies on which Goldman relies can be read multiple ways. 
In the one he cites most heavily, for example, there was a 
ten percent gap in perceived relevancy of the same result 
depending on whether it was presented to respondents as 
paid or organic, but that might simply reflect a useful 
heuristic, especially as searchers were generally able to find 
relevant results in the organic list.130 At the very least, the 
  
 129. The Supreme Court has generally considered anonymity and 
pseudonymity the same for constitutional purposes. See, e.g., McIntyre v. Ohio 
Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 341 (1995) (equating anonymous speech with 
“authors writing under assumed names”). In McIntyre, the pseudonym used was 
arguably misleading, in that it claimed to speak for a group of citizens 
(“CONCERNED PARENTS AND TAXPAYERS”) but was in fact produced only 
by one individual. See id. at 337. The Supreme Court nonetheless found that the 
First Amendment still barred a law requiring the individual to disclose her 
identity in order to engage in political speech. But a law targeted at 
impersonation would be quite different than that at stake in McIntyre. It seems 
likely that a law targeted at commercial sock-puppetry—borrowing a different 
consumer identity in order to avoid the credibility deficits of the commercial 
speaker’s real identity—would at least warrant more judicial deference. See 
McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 354 n. 18 (distinguishing McIntyre’s independent 
individual speech from corporate speech on the ground that identification of the 
source of corporate advertising “.) (quoting First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 
765, 792 n.32 (1978)); cf. VILI LEHDONVIRTA, TURKU SCHOOL OF ECON., VIRTUAL 
CONSUMPTION 45 (2009), http://info.tse.fi/julkaisut/vk/Ae11_2009.pdf 
(summarizing work on effects of pseudonymity); Kumayama, supra note 71, at 
444 (“With a name comes the ability to accrue reputational capital. This permits 
the actor to receive the same protections afforded by anonymity, but with the 
additional benefits that come with reputation—most notably, the ability to form 
enduring relationships.”) (footnotes omitted). If the Supreme Court adheres to 
this position, McIntyre is thus unlikely to pose a barrier to commercial 
disclosure requirements. See Meredith Hattendorf, Theoretical Splits and 
Consistent Results on Anonymous Political Speech: Majors v. Abell and ACLU of 
Nev. v. Heller, 50 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 925, 933-34 (2006).         
 130. See Bernard J. Jansen & Marc Resnick, Pa. State Univ., Examining 
Searcher Perceptions of and Interactions with Sponsored Results 4 (2005), 
http://www.ist.psu.edu/faculty_pages/jjansen/academic/pubs/jansen_ecommerce_
workshop.pdf (“[P]articipants rated 52% of the organic listings as relevant 
compared to only 42% of the sponsored listings.”). Participants rated pages they 
had accessed via “sponsored”-labeled links as about equally relevant to pages 
accessed via “organic”-labeled links, but because what was presented as 
“organic” and what was presented as “sponsored” had been manipulated, it is 
not clear how to interpret this finding: that is, they might have perceived 
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survey authors’ conclusion that search engine advertising 
won’t be a viable business without changes in consumer 
attitudes131 is a little odd, given that search engine 
advertising is practically the only profitable business model 
on the Web. More generally, outcomes in search engine 
studies suggest that labeled, sponsored ads can be quite 
useful to consumers. The label “paid” is not a major 
deterrent to following links, even if (or perhaps because) 
consumers apply a credibility discount to ads compared to 
organic results.132 Thus, disclosure seems unlikely to 
hamper welfare-enhancing uses of ads. 
What consumers hate even more than marketing, 
though, is late-discovered marketing: “Search engines that 
were less transparent about paid search results lost 
credibility. . . .”133 This last result supports the market-for-
lemons concern: consumers dislike stealth marketing 
enough to punish its (suspected or discovered) purveyors. 
We return to the point that the alternative to labeling rules 
is pervasive uncertainty.   
The negative consequences of nondisclosure for the 
trustworthy flow of information can also be seen by 
examining the flipside: the legal status of non-sponsored 
references and reviews. An unregulated regime would risk 
expanding trademark law even further to control expression 
about trademarked goods and services. If consumers must 
  
equality because, half the sponsored results having been relabeled as organic 
and vice versa, the relevance was equal. See id. at 5, figs. 3 & 4. 
 131. See Margaret Hopkins & Charles DuBois, Consumers Suspicious of 
Sponsored Links, PA. STATE LIVE, June 8, 2005, http://live.psu.edu/story/12348.  
 132. See Sha Yang & Anindya Ghose, Analyzing the Relationship Between 
Organic and Sponsored Search Advertising: Positive, Negative or Zero 
Interdependence? 3 (2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1491315. It appears that firms do best when their 
results appear as both organic and sponsored. See id. (manuscript at 4-5). 
Perhaps consumers use sponsored and organic results as relevancy checks on 
each other. See id. (manuscript at 25); see generally ICROSSING, SEARCH 
SYNERGY: NATURAL & PAID SEARCH SYMBIOSIS 3,5 (Mar. 1, 2007), 
http://www.icrossing.com/research/icrossing-search-synergy-report.php 
(reporting that organic and paid results synergistically reinforce one another); 
IPROSPECT, SEARCH ENGINE USER ATTITUDES 15-16 (Apr.-May 2004), 
http://www.iprospect.com/premiumPDFs/iProspectSurveyComplete.pdf 
(consumers tend to prefer organic results, but they also make significant use of 
sponsored results).  
 133. Jansen & Resnick, supra note 130, at 2. 
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expect an association between a trademark owner and a 
person who reviews that product (or even just when the 
review is positive), then trademark owners can argue 
actionable confusion when reviews are not to their taste. 
There are many plausible scenarios in which a rational 
trademark owner would object to a review, even one that 
wasn’t a vicious attack: positive but profane, racist, or 
otherwise untoward reviews; mixed reviews; or reviews 
appearing alongside content of which the trademark owner 
does not approve. If the law holds that consumers must 
reasonably expect anyone’s message to be associated with 
an undisclosed sponsor, then trademark owners will have 
firmer ground to make these extremely broad and speech-
suppressive claims.134 
Setting this problem aside, we are left with the difficult 
question of whether (possibly unwarranted) discounting of a 
sponsored message is better than (possibly unwarranted) 
credence given to an apparently unsponsored message. The 
real problem is that the very ideology of consumer 
competence which prompts calls for limiting the 
government’s power to regulate commercial speech is 
inconsistent with the pragmatic objection to disclosure: if 
consumers discount information once they know it is 
marketing, perhaps they were overvaluing it—using their 
own valuation schemes—beforehand. If the state can’t ban 
true information just because people might be convinced by 
it, then private parties also shouldn’t be able to conceal true 
information just because people might be convinced by it.135  
As a doctrinal matter, even in the context of political 
speech, courts have not required empirical evidence that 
identity disclosure improves decisionmaking. They have 
allowed regulators to rely on the strong intuition that such 
information is useful to citizens.136 In essence, given that 
  
 134. See Lemley & McKenna, supra note 54, at 414-15, 428, 444-45 (describing 
similar assertions and arguing that they should be rejected). 
 135. There is little reason to think that the market will provide the optimal 
level of disclosure, especially since efficient market theory itself assumes perfect 
information, and collapses in tangles when information is instead assessed as a 
cost. See JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE 
CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 35-41 (1996). 
 136. See, e.g., Raleigh Hannah Levine, The (Un)informed Electorate: Insights 
into the Supreme Court’s Electoral Speech Cases, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 225, 
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information regularly changes our preferences, a disclosure 
requirement is a precommitment to caring about source and 
sponsorship. It expresses a metapreference about how we 
want to make decisions and weigh information. This sort of 
precommitment strategy is a classic use of government to, 
in essence, tie ourselves to the mast.137 The widespread and 
intense hatred for intrusive and undisclosed marketing, 
which Goldman catalogs,138 is evidence that we consumers, 
acting as citizens, want to affect our own future decisions by 
providing ourselves with certain information that we might 
not otherwise have at the time we’re being sold a particular 
product. No matter how seductive a particular pitch sounds 
when we hear it, and no matter how much we would want to 
believe, after we were convinced by it, that we would have 
been equally convinced had we known the pitch was 
sponsored, we want to avoid that situation. We want to be 
reminded that we’re being approached for commercial gain 
at the time of the approach, so we can remember the 
reasons that we distrust ads in general.139 
  
251, 274, 289 (2003) (recognizing, though criticizing, this absence of empirical 
underpinning). 
 137. See, e.g., JON ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY, 
PRECOMMITMENT, AND CONSTRAINTS (2000); THOMAS C. SCHELLING, Ethics, Law, 
and the Exercise of Self-Command, in CHOICE AND CONSEQUENCE 83, 96-112 
(1984) (examining legal frameworks for precommitment); Steven Ratner, 
Precommitment Theory and International Law: Starting a Conversation, 81 TEX. 
L. REV. 2055, 2057 (2003) (“The theory of precommitment offers a framework for 
understanding the reasons that, and the methods by which, individuals and 
communities seek to bind themselves in the sense of preventing themselves 
from having full liberty of action at a time in the future.”); David L. Shapiro, 
Courts, Legislatures, and Paternalism, 74 VA. L. REV. 519, 522-25 (1988) 
(defending precommitment as an acceptable kind of self-paternalism). 
 138. Coasean Marketing, supra note 5, at 1152-54. 
  139.  This argument does have perhaps disturbing scope. It could, for example, 
be used to justify disclosure of attempts to buy popularity, such as paying 
consumers to watch videos so that they’ll make the list of “most watched,” link 
farming to improve a website’s position in search results, or buying books in 
bulk to help propel them to the top of best-seller lists. Most attempts to buy 
popularity—massive advertising campaigns—are self-evidently massive 
advertising campaigns and need no further disclosure. Nonetheless, if it 
becomes common to attempt to buy popularity in some other misleading way, 
and if self-defense by ranking entities fails (since Google, the New York Times, 
and other reporters on popularity generally try to filter out such manipulations), 
additional disclosure requirements could well be justified.  
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Goldman’s policy argument nonetheless has a 
constitutional dimension. In Riley v. National Federation of 
the Blind,140 the Supreme Court held that mandatory 
disclosure by fundraisers of the percentage of donated 
dollars spent on fundraising was an undue burden, in part 
because it might be misleading.141 People might not 
understand that a high fundraising cost for a small charity 
with limited appeal could be perfectly consistent with a true 
charitable purpose and function; they might hang up on the 
fundraiser as soon as they heard the high percentage of 
receipts retained by the fundraiser.142 Notably, the Supreme 
Court in Riley hypothesized that donors would be deterred 
from contributing by the disclosures, but did not have 
evidence of this.143  
Riley’s concern for disclosures that are in themselves 
misleading is a difficult argument for the regulatory 
position. Rather than positing careful and linguistically 
competent listeners, this criticism of disclosure engages 
with deceptiveness theory on its own terms, asking how 
  
 140. 487 U.S. 781 (1988). 
 141. The Court did not use the term “misleading,” but in presuming that 
disclosure would be “unfavorable,” id. at 799, it recalled its earlier discussion of 
valid reasons for devoting a high percentage of revenues to fundraising—if the 
cause is unpopular or the charity’s efforts involve education of listeners about 
the charity’s issue as part of fundraising appeals. See id. at 793-94. 
 142. Id. at 799-800 (“[C]ompelled disclosure will almost certainly hamper the 
legitimate efforts of professional fundraisers to raise money for the charities 
they represent. First, this provision necessarily discriminates against small or 
unpopular charities, which must usually rely on professional fundraisers. 
Campaigns with high costs and expenses carried out by professional fundraisers 
must make unfavorable disclosures, with the predictable result that such 
solicitations will prove unsuccessful. . . . Second, in the context of a verbal 
solicitation, if the potential donor is unhappy with the disclosed percentage, the 
fundraiser will not likely be given a chance to explain the figure; the disclosure 
will be the last words spoken as the donor closes the door or hangs up the 
phone.”). But see id. at 811 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (“[I]t seems to me that 
even in cases where the solicitation involves dissemination of a ‘message’ by the 
charity (through the fundraiser), the disclosure required by the statute at issue 
here will have little, if any, effect on the message itself, though it may have an 
effect on the potential donor’s desire to contribute financially to the cause.”). 
 143. See id. at 811-12 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); cf. Wright, supra note 117, 
at 476, 484 (suggesting that Riley is, at base, about the clash of two views of a 
well-functioning marketplace, one of which requires some government 
intervention to facilitate informed transactions and the other which trusts the 
market over government). 
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truthful (but arguably incomplete) information is actually 
processed by consumers.144 In other words, the concern for 
misapprehension might fairly be described as a 
paternalistic concern: people will receive truthful 
information and not know what to do with it.145 If the 
disclosure distorts consumers’ decisions more than 
nondisclosure does, then Riley suggests a First Amendment 
problem.  
Because Riley involved noncommercial speech and the 
Court was careful to limit its holding to such speech,146 the 
appropriate doctrinal answer might be that courts should 
defer to the FTC’s judgment that particular commercial 
  
 144. See generally Kreimer, supra note 114, at 79-82 (exploring the tension 
between the utility of disclosure to listeners and its ability to divert them from 
the speaker’s message); Tushnet, supra note 100, at 237, 250-51 (canvassing 
situations in which disclosure of truthful information might change preferences 
and/or generate further factual inferences about the meaning of the disclosed 
information); cf. Riley, 487 U.S. at 798 (“[W]e would not immunize a law 
requiring a speaker favoring a particular government project to state at the 
outset of every address the average cost overruns in similar projects, or a law 
requiring a speaker favoring an incumbent candidate to state during every 
solicitation that candidate’s recent travel budget. Although the foregoing factual 
information might be relevant to the listener, and, in the latter case, could 
encourage or discourage the listener from making a political donation, a law 
compelling its disclosure would clearly and substantially burden the protected 
speech.”). 
 145. Cf. Va. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 
748, 770 (1976) (“There is, of course, an alternative to this highly paternalistic 
approach. That alternative is to assume that this information is not in itself 
harmful, that people will perceive their own best interests if only they are well 
enough informed, and that the best means to that end is to open the channels of 
communication rather than to close them.”). Courts have since disfavored 
regulations that restrict information based on similar fears of how people will 
react to the message. See First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765,789-92 (1978) 
(“[Citizens] are entrusted with the responsibility for judging and evaluating the 
relative merits of conflicting arguments. They may consider, in making their 
judgment, the source and credibility of the advocate.  But if there be any danger 
that the people cannot evaluate the information and arguments advanced[,] . . . 
it is a danger contemplated by the Framers of the First Amendment.”) (footnote 
omitted); Geary v. Renne, 911 F.2d 280, 283 (9th Cir. 1990) (invalidating on 
First Amendment grounds regulations that prevented political parties from 
telling voters which nonpartisan candidates the parties supported), vacated as 
moot, 501 U.S. 312 (1991).   
 146. Riley, 487 U.S. at 796 & n.9 (explicitly distinguishing securities disclosure 
requirements because securities law regulates commercial speech); cf. Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(c) (1994) (governing disclosure). 
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speech is misleading. Other accepted legal regimes are also 
relevant, such as informed consent requirements. 
Legislatures and courts applying common law can require 
doctors and other professionals to disclose information 
because they conclude that patients and clients are entitled 
to additional information and may make better choices with 
it.147 Likewise, pharmaceutical companies are required to 
disclose drug side effects; clothes merchants are required to 
disclose the composition of the fabric they sell; 
manufacturers generally are required to disclose the 
country of origin of their goods; and so on.148 Turning these 
assessments into battles of the experts, such that mistakes 
about the net utility of the required information would 
result in First Amendment violations, would be a major, 
and unwarranted, change in constitutional law. The core 
issue is whether the government is allowed to find facts 
about deceptiveness. If it can (as would be required even for 
a basic ban on fraud), then its determinations, if made in 
procedurally reliable ways, deserve judicial deference.  
The issue of who decides what’s deceptive may explain 
why Riley was, from inception, sharply limited in its 
holding. Riley specifically stated that an identity disclosure 
  
 147. Robert Post, Informed Consent to Abortion: A First Amendment Analysis 
of Compelled Physician Speech, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 939, 968-72, 978-80 (2007) 
(“The state can require doctors to disclose accurate information, and it can 
equally prohibit doctors from providing misleading information.”).   
 148. See, e.g., United States v. Wenger, 292 F. Supp. 2d 1296, 1305-07 (D. 
Utah 2003) (upholding compelled disclosure under securities laws). 
“[S]upporting this conclusion are the wealth of federal and state regulatory 
programs which require disclosure of product or other commercial information,” 
including tobacco labeling, nutritional labeling, disclosures in prescription drug 
advertisements, disclosures of workplace hazards, and mandatory labeling of 
light bulbs to indicate if they contain mercury. Id. at 1307 (footnotes omitted); 
see also SEC v. Wall St. Publ’g Inst., Inc., 851 F.2d 365, 373-74 (D.C. Cir. 1988) 
(“In areas of extensive federal regulation—like securities dealing—we do not 
believe the Constitution requires the judiciary to weigh the relative merits of 
particular regulatory objectives that impinge upon communications occurring 
within the umbrella of an overall regulatory scheme. We note, however, that 
even if we were so required, disclosure requirements have been upheld in 
regulation of commercial speech even when the government has not shown that 
‘absent the required disclosure, [the speech would be false or deceptive] or that 
the disclosure requirement serves some substantial government interest other 
than preventing deception’ . . . Stock Market Magazine’s failure to disclose 
consideration received in return for publication is then, in principle, 
constitutionally proscribable.”); Tushnet, supra note 100, at 249-50 & n.104.  
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requirement—including a requirement that the fundraiser 
disclose his or her professional, which is to say paid, 
status—was constitutional notwithstanding that the law 
regulated fully protected noncommercial speech.149 This 
seems quite similar to the disclosure requirement as stated 
by the FTC. The policy basis for disclosure is generally 
contestable, but given the demonstrated relevance of source 
to evaluations of information’s credibility, source disclosure 
should be constitutionally permissible even if other 
mandatory disclosures would require more evidence on the 
state’s part.150  
This conclusion returns us to the idea of 
precommitment. Sponsorship disclosure can affect 
decisionmaking, in that a person who hears “this is an ad” 
may well discount the underlying claim more than she 
would have in the absence of the disclosure. But she is also 
likely to express a metapreference for knowing when she’s 
hearing ads. This preference puts source disclosure in a 
somewhat better position, even from an anti-paternalistic 
standpoint, than certain other types of disclosure, as to 
which consumers are likely to have much less well-formed 
desires for precommitment (e.g., it is unlikely that 
consumers give much thought to the appropriate amount 
they want charities to spend on fundraising). 
4. Endorsements as Facts. A final matter of significant 
theoretical interest is the question of what, exactly, is false 
or misleading about undisclosed endorsement relationships. 
In the U.S., the law has rarely attempted to regulate 
“image” advertising—advertising that does not make factual 
representations but attempts to create a “warm fuzzy glow” 
  
 149. Riley, 487 U.S. at 799 n.11 (“[N]othing in this opinion should be taken to 
suggest that the State may not require a fundraiser to disclose unambiguously 
his or her professional status. On the contrary, such a narrowly tailored 
requirement would withstand First Amendment scrutiny.”); cf. Leslie G. 
Espinoza, Straining the Quality of Mercy: Abandoning the Quest for Informed 
Charitable Giving, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 605, 627-29 (1991) (arguing that allowing 
mandated disclosure of professional fundraising status is not consistent with the 
Court’s own reasoning rejecting mandated disclosure of percentage of money 
spent on fundraising; both will have similar effects on targets’ decisionmaking 
and thus on charities). 
 150. Cf. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 391 (2000) (“The 
quantum of empirical evidence needed to satisfy heightened judicial scrutiny of 
legislative judgments will vary up or down with the novelty and plausibility of 
the justification raised.”). 
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or other feeling about a product or service.151 From a classic 
commercial speech perspective, regulation of image ads 
would be difficult to justify because such ads are not 
falsifiable.152 In false advertising doctrine, such claims are 
considered nonactionable puffery on which no reasonable 
consumer would rely.153 The law has, in other words, 
equated nonfalsifiability with unreliability, and irrebuttably 
presumed that consumers do not rely on that which is 
objectively unreliable. 
But what about an endorser paid to puff? The 
regulatory theory is that an undisclosed sponsorship 
relationship could distort consumer decisionmaking. Yet 
  
 151. Aside from initiatives to suppress cigarette marketing, the major 
exception might be dilution law, which regulates the creation of negative 
emotions about others’ brands. See Tushnet, supra note 14, at 522-24, 551-52.   
 152. Goodman, supra note 55, at 693; Nat Stern, In Defense of the Imprecise 
Definition of Commercial Speech, 58 MD. L. REV. 55, 119-21 & n.442-44 (1999) 
(“While the propositions that ‘America is turning 7-Up’ and that Burger King 
sells tastier hamburgers than McDonalds may elude scientific determination, 
presumably the television commercials containing these claims have not been 
the target of official censorship. And even if the FCC were to descend on 
sponsors or broadcasters of these sorts of boasts, it is difficult to construct a 
rationale that would sustain this suppression under current commercial speech 
doctrine.”) (footnotes omitted). 
 153. “There are some kinds of talk which no sensible man takes seriously, and 
if he does he suffers from his [own] credulity.” Vulcan Metals Co. v. Simmons 
Mfg. Co., 248 F. 853, 856 (2d Cir. 1918) (Hand, J.); see also Pizza Hut, Inc. v. 
Papa John’s Int’l, Inc., 227 F.3d 489, 496-97 (5th Cir. 2000) (“[N]on-actionable 
‘puffery’ comes in at least two possible forms: (1) an exaggerated, blustering, 
and boasting statement upon which no reasonable buyer would be justified in 
relying; or (2) a general claim of superiority over comparable products that is so 
vague that it can be understood as nothing more than a mere expression of 
opinion.”); In re General Motors Corp. Anti-Lock Brake Prods. Liab. Litig., 966 
F. Supp. 1525, 1531 (E.D. Mo. 1997) (plaintiffs alleged they had detrimentally 
relied on claims that anti-lock brakes were 99% more effective, and 100 times 
more likely to benefit drivers, than air bags, but such claims were puffery 
because consumers could not reasonably believe that there was a test 
supporting them), aff’d, 172 F.3d 623 (8th Cir. 1999); Tylka v. Gerber Prods. Co., 
No. 96 C 1647, 1999 WL 495126, at *8 (N.D. Ill. July 1, 1999) (nutrition claims 
“add[ed] little to the daily informational barrage to which consumers are 
exposed,” and a reasonable consumer should have seen that they were 
meaningless sales patter); Gillette Co. v. Norelco Consumer Prods. Co., 946 F. 
Supp. 115, 130 (D. Mass. 1996) (explaining the concept of puffery); Avon Prods. 
Inc. v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 32 U.S.P.Q.2d 1001, 1007 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (“Off! 
Skintastic is just a hundred times better!” was too exaggerated to be believed 
and, therefore, puffery). 
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how could there be material deception if the endorser’s 
positive but detail-free message was puffery? The 
endorsement guidelines implicitly recognize that, as 
advertising scholars have long maintained, image ads do 
affect consumer decisions—puffery works, which is why 
advertisers use it.154 Nonetheless, in the U.S., we usually do 
not try to regulate puffery because of the falsifiability 
problem. It is only when there is an undisclosed financial 
relationship that we can identify a specific element of the 
message that’s deceptive.155  
It is still important to recognize that in an undisclosed 
sponsorship case where the speaker simply puffs, the 
deception can only be material if vague, fact-free claims 
made by a sufficiently credible source affect purchase 
decisions.156 And, it should be emphasized, this paradox of 
material puffery is equally true in traditional ads, where 
the FTC has long required disclosure by endorsers where 
the endorsement relationship is not clear from context, 
regardless of whether an ad makes falsifiable factual 
claims.157  
  
 154. Richard Craswell, Interpreting Deceptive Advertising, 65 B.U. L. REV. 657, 
662 (1985); Ivan L. Preston, Puffery and Other “Loophole” Claims: How the 
Law’s “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” Policy Condones Fraudulent Falsity In Advertising, 
18 J.L. & COM. 49, 80-98 (1998). 
 155. Cf. SEC v. Curshen, Fed. Sec. & L. Rep. (BNA) ¶ 95,718, 2010 WL 
1444910,  at *6 (10th Cir. 2010) (observing that vague optimistic predictions 
from someone known to be associated with the company don’t violate the 
securities laws because they are easily understood as self-interested puffery, 
and holding that the court did not need to reach the question of whether the 
same statements would be nonactionable puffery if consumers weren’t aware of 
the self-interested nature of such positive statements). 
 156. Cf. People ex rel. Hartigan v. Maclean Hunter Publ’g Corp., 457 N.E.2d 
480, 487 (Ill. Ct. App. 1983) (“‘[I]t is true that a bare and naked statement as to 
value is ordinarily deemed the opinion of the party making the representation . . 
. [but] such statement may be a positive affirmation of a fact, intended as such 
by the party making it, and reasonably regarded as such by the party to whom it 
is made.  When it is such, it is like any other representation of fact . . . .”) 
(citations omitted). But see Goodman, supra note 55, at 704-05 (arguing that 
regulation of undisclosed sponsorship may not be justified if the claims are 
immaterial to consumers). 
 157. See Disclosure of Material Connections, 16 C.F.R. § 255.5  (“When there 
exists a connection between the endorser and the seller of the advertised 
product which might materially affect the weight or credibility of the 
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The cool kid who tells her friends that a product is 
really awesome can get them to buy it. The cool kid’s 
endorsement might even be performative, in that the 
endorsement makes the product cool. This is related to the 
problem of the placebo effect, where claiming that a product 
produces certain effects leads consumers to believe in (and 
even experience) those effects. The law has had little trouble 
finding that products that only work because of the placebo 
effect are falsely advertised.158 Regardless of how coolness is 
produced, it matters whether the cool kid is telling her 
friends voluntarily or for pay. This conclusion requires us to 
take even nonfalsifiable claims seriously as claims that can 
distort a consumer’s decisions. 
C. Statutory Interpretation: Does Section 230 Invalidate the 
FTC’s Guidance? 
Assuming that all these conceptual issues can, as I have 
argued, be resolved in favor of requiring disclosure and 
substantiation, section 230 appears again as a potential 
statutory barrier. Eric Goldman argued that the FTC’s new 
guidelines clearly targeted specific business models such as 
that of PayPerPost, which offers advertisers and bloggers 
pretty much what its name promises: matching, for pay, 
  
endorsement (i.e., the connection is not reasonably expected by the audience) 
such connection must be fully disclosed.”). 
 158. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. QT, Inc. 512 F.3d 858, 862-63 (7th Cir. 2008) 
(“[T]he Federal Trade Commission Act condemns material falsehoods in 
promoting consumer products; the statute lacks an exception for ‘beneficial 
deceit.’ . . . [T]he placebo effect cannot justify fraud in promoting a product.”); 
Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Pantron I Corp., 33 F.3d 1088, 1100 (9th Cir. 1994) 
(“[A]llowing advertisers to rely on the placebo effect would not only harm those 
individuals who were deceived; it would create a substantial economic cost as 
well, by allowing sellers to fleece large numbers of consumers who, unable to 
evaluate the efficacy of an inherently useless product, make repeat purchases of 
that product.”); United States v. An Article . . . Acu-Dot . . ., 483 F. Supp. 1311, 
1315 (N.D. Ohio 1980) (claims of efficacy from placebo effect are “‘misleading’ 
because the [product] is not inherently effective, its results being attributable to 
the psychosomatic effect produced by the advertising and marketing of the 
[product]”); In re Bristol-Myers Co., 102 F.T.C. 21, 336 (1983) (“‘The Commission 
cannot accept as proof of a product’s efficacy a psychological reaction stemming 
from a belief which, to a substantial degree, was caused by respondent’s 
deceptions. Indeed, were we to hold otherwise, advertisers would be encouraged 
to foist unsubstantiated claims on an unsuspecting public in the hope that 
consumers would believe the ads and the claims would be self-fulfilling.”) 
(citation omitted). 
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those who have products to tout with those who’d like to be 
paid for touting them.159 The FTC used the following 
example: 
A skin care products advertiser participates in a blog 
advertising service. The service matches up advertisers with 
bloggers who will promote the advertiser’s products on their 
personal blogs. The advertiser requests that a blogger try a 
new body lotion and write a review of the product on her blog. 
Although the advertiser does not make any specific claims 
about the lotion’s ability to cure skin conditions and the 
blogger does not ask the advertiser whether there is 
substantiation for the claim, in her review the blogger writes 
that the lotion cures eczema and recommends the product to 
her blog readers who suffer from this condition. The advertiser 
is subject to liability for misleading or unsubstantiated 
representations made through the blogger’s endorsement.160  
The advertiser’s responsibilities are a bit different from 
those it bears in conventional advertising, where the 
advertiser generally can exercise direct control over the 
content of the ad.161 To avoid liability, it must provide 
proper direction to endorsers on making clear and 
conspicuous disclosures about compensation and on 
avoiding misleading or unsubstantiated representations.  
And, if the blogger nonetheless makes misleading or 
unsubstantiated representations, the advertiser has to take 
reasonable steps to correct them. The advertiser should 
monitor the results of its promotional schemes (as one 
would hope it would monitor any advertising carried out on 
its behalf) and take reasonable steps to ensure that the 
guidelines are being followed.162 If the blogger refuses to 
  
 159. Posting of Eric Goldman to Technology & Marketing Blog, 
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2009/10/do_the_ftcs_new.htm (Oct. 6, 2009, 
10:04).   
 160. FTC Endorsement Guides, supra note 73, at 53,139 (emphasis added). 
 161. This is unsurprising; different forms of advertising have always been 
assessed based on advertiser control. Thus, while an advertiser may be required 
to stop an ongoing ad campaign on television, the FTC does not, so far as I am 
aware, order an advertiser to retrieve disseminated copies of a magazine to 
remove a misleading ad. In the Internet context, control simply plays out in 
different ways. 
162. See FTC Endorsement Guides, supra note 73, at 53,139 (“In order to limit 
its potential liability, the advertiser should ensure that the advertising service 
provides guidance and training to its bloggers concerning the need to ensure 
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disclose sponsorship, or to correct unsubstantiated or 
misleading statements, then the advertiser should sever 
relations with the blogger and not provide further 
compensation.163  
But does section 230 cover these promotional 
relationships, making this careful regulatory scheme 
impossible? Recall section 230’s mandates that “[n]o 
provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be 
treated as the publisher or speaker of any information 
provided by another information content provider.”164 Eric 
Goldman argued that, when PayPerPost makes a match 
with a blogger, “[t]here is no employment or agency 
relationship between the advertiser or the blogger; this is 
an ordinary customer-vendor relationship, mediated by 
PayPerPost.”165 If, without the advertiser’s further input, 
the blogger then made a truthful166 statement about her 
experience with the product that would be impermissible if 
made by the advertiser, the FTC might still hold the 
advertiser responsible for the statement. This, he continued, 
was a classic section 230 situation: “the advertiser is the 
user of an interactive computer service, the blog post is 
content provided by another information content provider, 
and the FTC’s theory that the advertiser adopts or endorses 
the blog post treats the advertiser as the publisher or 
speaker of the third party blogger’s blog post.”167  
The key point here is that the advertiser must be a 
“user” of an interactive computer service to qualify for 
section 230 protection, and Goldman offered two arguments 
for why this is so: “First, PayPerPost provides an interactive 
computer service, and the advertiser uses PayPerPost. 
  
that statements they make are truthful and substantiated. The advertiser 
should also monitor bloggers who are being paid to promote its products and 
take steps necessary to halt the continued publication of deceptive 
representations when they are discovered.”). 
 163. See id. at 53,135-36.  
 164. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006) (emphasis added). 
 165. Posting of Eric Goldman to Technology & Marketing Law Blog, 
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2009/10/ a_fuller_defens.htm (Oct. 12, 2009, 
11:55). 
 166. In fact, under Goldman’s theory, even if the blogger deliberately lied 
about her experience, the advertiser would not be liable. 
 167. Goldman, supra note 165. 
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Second, the advertiser is a ‘user’ of some Internet 
connectivity provider just by getting online.”168 He admitted 
that his second theory was “perhaps disconcertingly” 
expansive: anyone online is entitled to section 230 
immunity.169 On this theory, for example, a newspaper 
would no longer be liable for the defamatory statements of 
its reporters, at least if the newspaper publishes online. 
Still, Goldman defended his result as consistent with 
section 230’s broad scope: “unless the plaintiff’s claim fits 
into one of the statutory exclusions[,] . . . A isn’t liable for 
third party B’s online content or actions. Period.”170 If A is 
the advertiser and B is the blogger, A simply can’t be liable 
for B’s posts. 
In fact, Goldman’s logic goes further than that: Section 
230 states that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive 
computer service shall be treated as the publisher or 
speaker of any information provided by another information 
content provider.”171 The statute does not by its terms 
specify that the “information” provided by the content 
provider has to be provided online, or in its role as online 
information content provider, in order for immunity to 
attach. Barnes & Noble has a website and is therefore a 
provider of an interactive computer service. If we are 
determined to read section 230 expansively, Barnes & Noble 
should be immune from liability for defamatory content in a 
book it sold in its physical stores, because the book’s 
publisher would be another information content provider. In 
addition, it should be immune if it contracted to distribute 
the book via email, thus making its use of the Internet a 
but-for cause of the harm, even if Barnes & Noble knew 
about the defamatory content and otherwise satisfied the 
conditions for defamation liability for a distributor.  
Because Goldman identifies section 230 as an Internet 
exceptionalist statute,172 he would likely not endorse the   
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. Goldman contended that the leading section 230 cases treat “user” 
just this expansively. See id. (citing Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510 (Cal. 
2006)).   
 170. Goldman, supra note 165. 
 171. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 172. Posting of Eric Goldman to Technology & Marketing Law Blog, 
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2008/04/roommatescom_de_1.htm (Apr. 3, 
2008, 8:05).   
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offline reading. Furthermore, courts have required that the 
information at issue be provided to an online service 
provider in its role as online service provider.173 But if we 
imply a requirement that the information at issue must be 
provided online for the immunity to attach, it is not clear 
why we cannot impose liability based on offline/non-
information-based elements of a relationship. 
So what about A’s payment to B? Goldman argued that 
this was irrelevant. He pointed out that in the early case of 
Blumenthal v. Drudge,174 AOL won a section 230 defense 
against liability for Matt Drudge’s allegedly defamatory 
content, even though AOL both paid Drudge to produce 
content and retained editorial control over that content.175 
Nor, Goldman argued, did the payment in the PayPerPost 
example create a respondeat superior or employer-employee 
relationship between the parties176 (apparently conceding 
  
 173. See, for example, Batzel v. Smith, where the court explained:  
[Section 230] is concerned with providing special immunity for 
individuals who would otherwise be publishers or speakers, because of 
Congress’s concern with assuring a free market in ideas and information 
on the Internet. If information is provided to those individuals in a 
capacity unrelated to their function as a provider or user of interactive 
computer services, then there is no reason to protect them with the 
special statutory immunity.  
333 F.3d 1018, 1033 (9th Cir. 2003); cf. Avery v. Idleaire Techs. Corp., No. 3:04-
CV-312, 2007 WL 1574269, at *20 (E.D. Tenn. May 29, 2007) (rejecting a section 
230 defense that an employer was not responsible for the creation of a hostile 
work environment based in part on the presence in the workplace of 
pornography downloaded from the Internet by employees). The Avery court did 
not explain its reasoning, but the intuition that the harassment was unrelated 
to the employer’s role as Internet user may have been a part of its conclusion.  
 174. 992 F. Supp. 44, 49-53 (D.D.C. 1998). 
 175. Goldman, supra note 165. 
 176. Goldman stated:  
I don’t think the example indicates an agency relationship because the 
advertiser lacks the requisite control over the blogger. PayPerPost’s 
mediation of the advertiser-blogger relationship further reinforces the 
lack of agency; indeed, the advertiser may not even be communicating 
directly with the blogger. And even if the blogger were the advertiser’s 
employee or agent, 230 still might apply for the blogger’s statements that 
exceed the advertiser’s authorization. 
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that section 230 would not protect an online newspaper 
against defamation based on its employee-reporters’ 
statements).177 Unlike Quiznos, with its user-generated 
advertising, the skin cream maker in the FTC’s example 
“never republished the blog post or even signaled any 
adoption of or agreement with the post.” Given the 
“tenuous” relationship between the advertiser and the 
blogger, he concluded, the FTC was simply overreaching.178  
I think Goldman reads “user” too broadly in either 
version of his argument.179 A more natural reading of the 
function of the term “user” in the statute is that a Blogspot 
blogger is a user of Google’s services, and is not responsible 
for content in his comments section, which is provided by 
other users of Google’s services. In the PayPerPost case, the 
advertiser is not a “user” in the conventional sense of 
  
Id. (citing Delfino v. Agilent Techs., 52 Cal. Rptr. 3d 376, 397-99 (Ct. App. 2006) 
and Higher Balance, LLC v. Quantum Future Group, Inc., No. 08-233-HA, 2008 
WL 5281487, at 6*-7* (D. Or. Dec. 18, 2008)).  
 177. Paul Alan Levy made the following criticism of Professor Goldman:  
[Goldman] implicitly acknowledges that if the blogger were actually the 
in-house employee of the advertiser, action could be taken against the 
advertiser under the doctrine of respondeat superior, so long as the blog 
post was written within the scope of the blogger’s employment. That is 
what the court said in the Delfino case that Professor Goldman mentions, 
although the court found that the posts in question there were outside the 
scope of employment. 
 Posting of Paul Alan Levy to CL&P Blog, http://pubcit.typepad.com/ 
clpblog/2009/10/do-the-ftcs-new-advertising-guidelines-run-afoul-of-section 
230.html (Oct. 16, 2009, 14:20 PST) (citation omitted).   
 178. Goldman, supra note 165. See also Posting of Eric Goldman to Technology 
and Marketing Law Blog, http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2009/ 
10/craigslist_isnt.htm (Oct. 21, 2009, 13:13 PST), where Goldman argues that a 
recent case involving Craigslist supports his interpretation. But the court in 
that case actually found that Craigslist did not create the unlawful content at 
issue, and thus could not be treated as the speaker. See Dart v. Craigslist, Inc., 
No. 09 C 1385, 2009 WL 3416106, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 20, 2009). It did not hold 
that Craigslist or any other entity could escape derivative liability regardless of 
the relationship between itself and another party posting content. 
 179. See also Levy, supra note 177 (“Professor Goldman has not taken 
adequate account of the fact that the FTC is regulating the advertiser, not in its 
capacity as the provider or user of an interactive computer service, but in its 
capacity as the employer (in a larger sense) of the blogger.”). 
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providing content via the service provider.180 In fact, the 
blogger does not “use” PayPerPost to post content either. 
Money, not content, flows through PayPerPost, even if it 
operates over the Internet and even if it relies on content 
posted on the Internet to determine when to pay that 
money. 
Section 230, as an Internet exceptionalist statute, 
prevents treating Internet service providers as publishers, 
and even as distributors. Quiznos, when it hosted the 
allegedly false user-generated ads over which Subway sued, 
was acting as a service provider. Section 230 should have 
precluded liability, even though Quiznos suggested topics 
for submitted content, just as moderators of discussion 
boards do.181 Likewise, I am persuaded by Goldman’s 
argument that the Securities & Exchange Commission is 
barred by section 230 from treating misstatements to which 
a company links on the Internet as the company’s own 
misstatements for purposes of enforcing the securities 
laws.182  
  
 180. Section 230’s use of the term “provided” reinforces this interpretation; 
section 230 is not aimed at protecting parties to whom content is not provided. 
Compare Batzel v. Smith, where the court explained: 
“[P]rovided” suggests, at least, some active role by the “provider” in 
supplying the material to a “provider or user of an interactive computer 
service.” One would not say, for example, that the author of a magazine 
article “provided” it to an interactive computer service provider or user by 
allowing the article to be published in hard copy off-line.  Although such 
an article is available to anyone with access to a library or a newsstand, it 
is not ‘provided’ for use on the Internet.   
The result in the foregoing example should not change if the interactive 
computer service provider or user has a subscription to the magazine. In 
that instance, the material in question is “provided” to the “provider or 
user of an interactive computer service,” but not in its role as a provider 
or user of a computer service.  
333 F.3d 1018, 1032-33 (9th Cir. 2003) (emphasis added). 
 181. One might also conclude that the underlying logic of the Lanham Act does 
not support treating fans’ speech as Quiznos’ speech. 
 182. See Posting of Eric Goldman to Technology & Marketing Law Blog, 
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2008/11/secs_proposed_g.htm (Nov. 5, 2008, 
20:58 PST); Posting of Eric Goldman to Technology & Marketing Law Blog, 
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2008/08/sec_proposes_th.htm (Aug. 28, 
2008, 18:10 PST).  
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But section 230 does not change every aspect of the law 
of blaming one entity for another’s acts.183 A corporation can 
only act through individuals.184 If the idea that a corporation 
can be held liable for content it provides online is to have 
any meaning after section 230, then it must be the case that 
some kinds of relationships are sufficient to attribute one 
entity’s content to another. At that point, we are arguing 
over the contours of agency liability, not over its existence, 
and the common law already provides for liability for non-
employee agents in appropriate circumstances.  
The Restatement (Third) of Agency recognizes that 
agency liability may be contracted or expanded by law.185 
Courts have a role in defining agency depending on the 
  
 183. Cf. Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1035-36 (applying principal-agent law to decide a 
defamation claim rather than section 230, where defendant was alleged to be 
vicariously liable for content posted by another defendant).   
 184. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.01 cmt. b (2006) (“When an 
agent is an organization, such as a corporation or other legal entity, it can 
perform work only by deploying individuals to take action on its behalf as 
subagents.”). 
 185. See, e.g., id. § 7.06 (2006) (“A principal required by contract or otherwise 
by law to protect another cannot avoid liability by delegating performance of the 
duty, whether or not the delegate is an agent.”) (emphasis added); id. § 7.08 cmt. 
b (discussing statutory bases for liability in the absence of a principal-agent 
relationship); id. § 7.01 cmt. c (2006) (recognizing that statutes may change the 
common law, including whether an agent is responsible for wrongful conduct 
and whether liability is strict); see also, e.g., U.C.C. § 8-318 (1977) (stating that 
an agent or bailee who deals with securities in good faith is not liable in 
conversion to a third party even though the principal had no right to deal with 
the securities, altering the common law rule that an agent has no greater title 
than her principal as set forth in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 349 
(1958)); 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 455/1, 455/37.11, 455/10, 455/38.5(a) (West 
1993 & Supp. 1997) (abrogating the common law of agency for real estate agents 
and replacing it with statutory duties on the grounds of public interest in 
avoiding misunderstandings); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 
326 (1992) (discussing Fair Labor Standards Act’s expansion of “employment” 
beyond traditional agency law); UNIF. PROBATE CODE art. 5, pt. 5, prefatory n. 
(2006) (noting that the purpose of a statutory durable power is alteration of the 
common law, which terminated an agent’s authority upon the principal’s 
incapacity); Charles D. Tobin & Drew Shenkman, Online and Off-Line Publisher 
Liability and the Independent Contractor Defense, 26 COMM. LAWYER (ABA), 
Mar. 2009, at 1-2 (noting that common law immunity of hiring parties for 
independent contractors’ torts has been changed under various circumstances, 
including “where a statute or regulation imposes particular responsibility on the 
principal, or where the duty is so integral to the principal’s business that it is 
presumed to be ‘non-delegable’”). 
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circumstances.186 Copyright is an example of an area of law 
which has, by common law judicial interpretive techniques, 
expanded vicarious liability far beyond its basis in 
respondeat superior.187 Sexual harassment law, too, has 
adapted agency law to its particular purposes.188 The 
contours of secondary liability are malleable depending on 
the perceived policy goals of the relevant cause of action. 
  
 186. See, e.g., Grace M. Giesel, Client Responsibility for Lawyer Conduct: 
Examining the Agency Nature of the Lawyer-Client Relationship, 86 NEB. L. REV. 
346, 348-49, 373-74, 377-78 (2007) (stating that courts routinely deviate from 
the common law of agency in assessing lawyer-client relationships, based on a 
preference for protecting clients over other policy considerations, and 
highlighting deviations from common law on the basis of a policy preference for 
protecting clients over all else). 
 187. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1022 (9th Cir. 
2001) (“Vicarious copyright liability is an ‘outgrowth’ of respondeat superior.”) 
(citing Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 261-62 (9th Cir. 
1996)); Polygram Int’l Publ’g, Inc. v. Nev./TIG, Inc., 855 F. Supp. 1314, 1325-26 
(D. Mass. 1994) (describing vicarious liability as a form of risk allocation). Dixon 
v. Atl. Recording Corp., held that it was unnecessary to consider the intricacies 
of agency law, instead using a less formal approach:   
[A] person who promotes or induces an infringement can be held liable as 
a “vicarious infringer,” even through [sic] he has no actual knowledge 
that a copyright is being violated, if (1) he has the right and ability to 
control or supervise the infringing activity, and (2) he has a direct 
financial interest in the exploitation of the copyrighted materials. 
No. 85 Civ. 287, 1985 WL 3049, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 4, 1985); see also Robyn 
Axberg, File-Sharing Tools and Copyright Law: A Study of In re Aimster 
Copyright Litigation and MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 35 LOY. U. CHI. 
L.J. 389, 399 (2003) (“Vicarious liability emerged as a modification of the 
common-law tradition of respondeat superior, but in the realm of copyright 
infringement, it extends beyond the employment setting.”) (footnotes omitted).   
  188.  See, e.g., Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 545 (1999) (“In light 
of the perverse incentives that the Restatement’s ‘scope of employment’ rules 
create, we are compelled to modify these principles to avoid undermining the 
objectives underlying Title VII.”); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 
802 n. 3 (1998) (“[O]ur obligation here is not to . . . transplant [Restatement of 
Agency provisions] into Title VII. Rather, it is to adapt agency concepts to the 
practical objectives of Title VII.”); Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 
U.S. 57, 72 (1986) (“[C]ommon-law principles may not be transferable in all 
their particulars to Title VII . . . .”); see also David B. Oppenheimer, Employer 
Liability for Sexual Harassment by Supervisors, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL 
HARASSMENT LAW 272, 278-79 (Catharine A. MacKinnon & Reva B. Siegel eds., 
2004) (discussing the evolution of respondeat superior liability for sexual 
harassment under Title VII).  
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In fact, the Restatement (Third) of Agency allows 
vicarious liability for non-employee agents when actions 
taken with apparent authority constituted the tort or 
enabled the agent to conceal its commission.189 Making a 
false or unsubstantiated factual claim, or failing to disclose 
the economic relationship between the parties, are the 
wrongs targeted by the Endorsement Guidelines, which 
would at least seem to be a close analogy to constituting the 
tort or enabling its concealment, respectively. Of course, in 
cases of nondisclosure, nothing at all is “apparent.” But at 
least when there is disclosure of sponsorship, that 
disclosure would seem to create apparent authority under 
the common law sufficient to allow the substantiation 
requirement to apply, since it signals to consumers that the 
advertiser is at least partly responsible for the content. And, 
though it does not appear that the law regarding 
undisclosed principals has addressed similar situations of 
nondisclosure, it seems unlikely that advertisers ought to be 
allowed to avoid a finding of an agency relationship simply 
by not disclosing that there is a relationship. 
I readily accept that section 230 bars finding a 
respondeat superior or other agency relationship based on 
the fact that one party provides Internet access or some 
Internet service to the other, even when the second party 
gets payment as a condition of or consideration for access. 
Such was the basic relationship Congress contemplated 
when it decided to immunize access providers for users’ 
content. But that conclusion doesn’t put any barrier in place 
to finding an agency relationship based on other elements of 
a relationship.190  
  
 189. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.08 (2006);  see also Dennis A. 
Ferraro & Joseph A. Camarra, Hospital Liability: Apparent Agency or Agency by 
Estoppel?, 76 ILL. B.J. 364, 366, 368-70 (1988) (explaining that many 
jurisdictions hold hospitals liable for torts of independent contractor physicians 
based on actual or apparent authority); Giesel, supra note 186, at 357-58 (noting 
that both the Restatement (Second) and Restatement (Third) clearly 
contemplate agency liability for independent contractors based on actual or 
apparent authority). 
 190. Thus, in accomplishing its mission, the FTC is free to find a relevant 
agency relationship in the situation referenced by the Endorsement Guidelines, 
where the advertiser’s payment is not linked to provision of access for the 
blogger. This would be analogous to finding an agency relationship where the 
person qualifies as an employee or independent contractor according to 
background principles of agency law. See, e.g., Whitney Info. Network, Inc. v. 
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There remains the precedent of Drudge, in which AOL 
paid Matt Drudge to provide content and yet still escaped 
liability because of section 230.191 Under standard agency 
principles, as applied in defamation law, Drudge was not an 
agent or employee of AOL. If he had been, the Court’s 
discussion implies that section 230 would not have 
immunized AOL.192 The true limit, then, comes from the 
underlying law of defamation, the constitutional 
underpinnings of which shape courts’ determinations of 
when parties can be liable for defamatory statements made 
by their independent contractors.  
One might argue, drawing on other section 230 cases, 
that an advertiser cannot be held liable for users’ false 
statements unless the advertiser specifically induces the 
falsity, rather than inducing the content generally. In a case 
involving Craigslist’s alleged inducement of prostitution, 
the court held that Craigslist could not be held liable 
because its “adult” category was not inherently unlawful as 
compared to a site that required users to express unlawful 
preferences.193 “Nothing in the service [C]raigslist offers 
induces anyone to post any particular listing . . . .”194 
Likewise, the Ninth Circuit, ruling on a challenge to 
  
Xcentric Venture, LLC, 199 F. App’x 738, 742-44 (11th Cir. 2006) (denying 
section 230 motion to dismiss based on allegation that defendant’s employees 
had themselves written defamatory statements about the plaintiff); Cornelius v. 
DeLuca, No. CV-10-27-S-BLW, 2010 WL 1709928 (D. Idaho Apr. 26, 2010) 
(rejecting a motion to dismiss defamation claims against a website owner based 
on allegations that a forum moderator, allegedly acting as a representative of 
the website, made defamatory statements). 
  191. Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1998). 
 192. Id. at 50 & n.9. Compare to Paul Alan Levy’s explanation that:  
[In Blumenthal v. Drudge,] AOL was sued only as the publisher of 
content on its own interactive computer service, and Blumenthal had 
brought a defamation claim under a local law regime that presumably 
accepts the limits of respondeat superior-type liability to employers and 
employees.  Admittedly, though, Blumenthal v. Drudge did not discuss 
the lack of liability in those terms.  
Levy, supra note 177. 
 193. Dart v. Craigslist, Inc., No. 09 C 1385, 2009 WL 3416106, at *6 (N.D. Ill. 
Oct. 20, 2009). 
 194. Id. at *5 (emphasis added) (quoting Chicago Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil 
Rights v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 671 (7th Cir. 2008)). 
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racially, religiously, or otherwise discriminatory ads for 
roommates found on the Roommate.com website, found that 
the site could not be held liable for the open-ended essay 
portion of its form, because users had free rein to post 
whatever they liked, including discriminatory content.195 As 
long as the advertiser doesn’t require falsity or 
nondisclosure, the argument would go, it can’t be liable for 
creating a structure that in practice encourages such 
behavior, the way that minimally moderated websites 
encourage people to express defamatory statements. But 
that does not answer the agency point. Courts’ rejections of 
inducement theories as ways around section 230 mean only, 
and vitally, that being a seductive forum for unlawful 
content—an attractive nuisance, as it were—is protected by 
section 230. Other types of causation need not be shielded. 
In short, even under section 230, if there is an agency 
relationship between two parties, that relationship can be 
used as the basis of liability.196 Paul Alan Levy nicely makes 
the point that the FTC need not apply the common law of 
agency any more than its definition of falsity and 
misleadingness conforms exactly to the common law of 
fraud: 
[G]iven the FTC’s broad regulatory authority, the FTC is not 
obligated to accept the “scope of employment” limitation of 
respondeat superior, and it is not required to accept the limitation 
of respondeat superior to the actions of “employees.” Its 
advertising guidelines have long held companies responsible for 
misleading advertisements published by independent contractors, 
and by the same token the FTC is not required to agree that a 
company can insulate itself from responsibility for the advertising 
  
 195. Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommate.com, LLC, 521 
F.3d 1157, 1173-74 (9th Cir. 2008).  However, the website operator could not 
claim section 230 immunity for discriminatory questions, which “don’t magically 
become lawful when asked electronically online. The Communications Decency 
Act was not meant to create a lawless no-man’s-land on the Internet.” Id. at 
1164; see also id. at 1172 & n.33 (explaining why section 230 is not applicable to 
discriminatory questions created by the service provider). 
 196. See Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1102 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[C]ourts 
must ask whether the duty that the plaintiff alleges the defendant violated 
derives from the defendant’s status or conduct as a ‘publisher or speaker.’ If it 
does, section 230(c)(1) precludes liability.”); see also Chicago Lawyers, 519 F.3d 
at 671 (explaining that Craigslist could not be liable for users’ discriminatory 
housing advertisements under §230(c)(1) because it was not the author of the 
ads and could not be treated as the “speaker” of posters’ words).   
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that it purchases by contracting with one company that in turn 
contracts with an individual who publishes the misleading 
content.197 
A recent administrative adjudication suggests that the 
pay-for-posting situation poses a genuinely new challenge to 
the question of advertiser liability, one that the FTC might 
reasonably resolve either way. In re Gemtronics, Inc.198 
began with the proposition that “liability [for false 
advertising] does not require proof that the respondent 
physically distributed advertisements . . . . Moreover, a 
respondent need not be the sole cause of dissemination of 
false advertisements, but can be held liable for participating 
with others in the creation and/or dissemination of false 
advertisements.”199 The law holds advertisers liable when 
they cause the dissemination of false advertising, regardless 
of their intentions.200 However, the party to be held liable 
must have participated in the creation or dissemination of 
the ads.201 Thus, a manufacturer has been held liable for ads 
it provided to distributors, but not for ads prepared by its 
distributors.202  
Applying these principles, the Administrative Law 
Judge (“ALJ”) found that a respondent was not liable for 
false ads on a website that had directed business to him 
when there was no agreement with the actual source of the 
website to direct business to him.203 In fact, his name was 
used on the website without his permission and purchases 
made through the website went to other parties, not to him 
(though he did fulfill some small orders placed through the 
website as an unpaid courtesy to the website operator, with 
  
 197. Levy, supra note 177.   
 198. No. 9330, F.T.C. (Sept. 16, 2009) (initial decision), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9330/091002gemtronicsinitialdec.pdf.  
 199. Id. at 5. 
 200. See id. at 51 (“[T]he phrase ‘cause to be disseminated’ in Section 12 of  the 
FTC Act ‘is in the statute without qualification related to the advertiser’s state 
of mind’ and that ‘the statute holds him liable for the natural consequences of 
his act regardless of his intentions.’”) (quoting Mueller v. United States, 262 
F.2d 443, 446 (5th Cir. 1958)).   
 201. Id. at 6.   
 202. See id. (citing In re Dobbs Truss Co., 48 F.T.C. 1090 (1952), 1952 FTC 
LEXIS 49, at *50-51). 
  203. Id. at 55. 
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whom he had a business relationship).204 The ALJ pointed 
out that past cases involved active participation in creation 
or dissemination of advertisements.205  
The key question is: what counts as active 
participation? In the case of user endorsements, does paying 
for the creation of the ad without exercising any creative 
control suffice? A manufacturer would be liable for a false 
ad produced by an ad agency to which it had delegated 
complete creative control, and it would be possible to extend 
the same reasoning to others paid to produce ads. In at least 
one prior case, the FTC has relied in part on the fact that a 
manufacturer did not pay any advertising allowance or 
other financial aid to its distributors to find that the 
manufacturer was not responsible for the distributors’ false 
advertising.206 Change that fact, and the result could readily 
change.  
Even in the absence of section 230 protection, there are 
likely to be constitutional constraints on the types of 
relationships that can sustain liability, depending on the 
underlying cause of action. Defamation liability for 
intermediaries such as newspapers, for example, has been 
sharply limited in order to avoid chilling speech, even when 
the newspapers are paid to run allegedly defamatory ads.207 
Agency law has recognized these First Amendment 
constraints in its treatment of defamation.208 Some baseline 
  
  204. Id. 
 205. See id. at 53 (“An advertising agency may be held liable for deceptive 
advertising if the agency (1) was an active participant in the preparation of the 
advertisement, and (2) knew or had reason to know that the advertisement was 
deceptive.”) (citations omitted). 
 206. See In re Dobbs Truss Co., 1952 FTC LEXIS at *49.   
 207. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964); Rebecca 
Tushnet, Power Without Responsibility: Intermediaries and the First 
Amendment, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 986, 1005-09 (2008). 
 208. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.08 cmt. d (2006). A reporter’s 
note in the Restatement explained that because the credibility of a defamatory 
statement is affected by the credibility of the person who appears to endorse it, 
defamation liability can be tied to apparent authority. Despite this, “[m]any 
cases interpret Sullivan to incorporate an implicit requirement that the plaintiff 
establish actual malice independently against each defendant,” except that 
malice is imputed from employee to employer. Id. § 7.08 reporter’s n.d (citing 
McFarlane v. Esquire Magazine, 74 F.3d 1296, 1302 (D.C. Cir. 1996). The 
MacFarlane court interpreted Sullivan as refusing “to impute to the individuals 
as principals any information in the minds of persons they authorized to act as 
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due process principle might also prevent certain kinds of 
agency attributions, such as holding advertisers liable for 
unsolicited, uncompensated statements made by simple 
fans of the product or service.209 This is as yet a purely 
theoretical concern, because the FTC has not proposed to 
regulate nonsponsored posts even if they are made on 
advertiser-run discussion boards or forums. In such cases, a 
section 230 argument would also retain compelling force.210  
CONCLUSION 
Advertising is protean where law is not. But advertising 
is not special that way; the problem of adapting to new 
variants of behavior, some shaped precisely to avoid 
regulation, is a typical one and need not defeat the law. 
A theory of why people and entities choose to speak in 
particular ways helps us navigate the boundaries of 
commercial speech. The current debate over undisclosed 
endorsement deals reveals lacunae in our understanding 
and accommodation of how speech really works. For 
example, the way in which regulation of pay-for-posting 
schemes requires us to acknowledge that what is 
conventionally called puffery actually does influence 
consumers. Material puffery is an aspect of the infinite 
malleability of attention-getting strategies—nonfalsifiable 
claims may well persuade consumers—and highlights the 
  
their agents in the matter.” 74 F.3d at 1302. See also Cantrell v. Forest City 
Publ’g Co., 419 U.S. 245, 253–54 & n.6 (1974) (approving unchallenged jury 
instruction allowing plaintiff to use actual malice of employee to prove 
employer’s actual malice); Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 832 F. Supp. 
1350, 1370 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (“Indeed, the requirement that the defendant’s state 
of mind be proven is the cornerstone of the constitutional requisite that a 
plaintiff prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant acted with 
knowledge of or a reckless disregard of the truth.”), aff’d, 85 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 
1996);  Tobin & Shenkman, supra note 185. 
 209. Note, however, that product liability law is sometimes prepared to hold 
manufacturers liable for third-party uses that were sufficiently foreseeable. The 
intuition that there are limits on responsibility for other people’s statements 
made about products and services once they enter the stream of commerce 
draws on free speech principles, not just general due process considerations. I 
thank Mark Tushnet for discussion on this point. 
 210. Of course consumers might well expect fans to congregate on the sites run 
by their favored brands, so such sites do not pose much of an “astroturf” problem 
in the first place. 
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distance between consumer decisionmaking and abstract 
concepts of truth and falsity.211 Given the effectiveness of 
endorsements, even those light on facts, disclosure is 
justified to allow consumers to apply their own preferred 
discount to advertiser-sponsored speech. 
As with many speech controversies, new forms of 
advertising raise institutional competence questions. In this 
case, courts could allow the FTC to use agency law to fine-
tune section 230 to deal with endorsements. The alternative 
would be to read section 230 aggressively, even perhaps to 
the point of eliminating liability based on agency or on 
nonemployee agency. This would force Congress to act if it 
concludes that the law sweeps too broadly. I have argued 
that nothing in free speech theory or doctrine counsels in 
favor of such a radical reading. Given that section 230 is a 
prophylactic, speech-protective measure designed to avoid 
over-policing of speech by service providers, it could be read 
to bar the FTC’s guidelines, but it need not be to fulfill its 
purposes. 
The uncertainty over section 230’s scope is 
unsurprising. Congress did not anticipate how online speech 
would develop. The fear behind section 230 is that holding 
an intermediary liable seems compelling in individual cases 
but is cumulatively harmful to a valued endeavor, the cheap 
and open Internet. Given more experience with the law and 
with marketing practices developing online, we could 
consider making finer distinctions between types of content 
and providers’ relationship to that content, as we do with 
respect to intellectual property.212 Or we could conclude that 
ISP liability, like attention, should generally be managed in 
  
 211. Cf. Amy J. Tindell, “Indecent” Deception: The Role of Communications 
Decency Act § 230 in Balancing Consumer and Marketer Interests Online, 2009 
B.C. INTELL. PROP. & TECH. FORUM 071901 at *29-30 (2009) (“The Internet has 
spawned novel marketing strategies for businesses, including the guerilla tactic 
of ads popping onto the screen of unsuspecting Internet users, paying search 
engines for placement near the top of search results, and using competitor 
names as metatags. Laws made today to combat these problems may prove 
ineffective tomorrow as marketers use technology to work around existing legal 
structures to change consumer behavior.”). 
 212. E.g., 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2006) (enumerating the detailed “safe harbor” 
provisions for online service providers); Tiffany Inc. v. eBay, 576 F. Supp. 2d 
463, 468-70 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); see also Tindell, supra note 211, at *28-29 (arguing 
that Congress should act specifically to deal with the relationship between 
advertising and section 230). 
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gross, without subtle distinctions that are difficult to 
navigate in practice. The only sure thing is that advertisers 
will invent new claims and methods of delivery that will 
require new responses. 
 
